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THE MANAGER'S SHARE
DAVID I. WALKER*
ABSTRACT
It is sometimes argued in the corporate governance literature
that the total share of corporate value that can be extracted by
a manager is fixed and independent of the avenues through
which value is extracted. Shareholders need not worry about an
activity such as insider trading, the story goes, because any
profits achieved by a manager through insider trading will
simply offset conventional compensation. This Article challenges
that idea and argues that whether one views the manager's
share as being capped by external market forces, set by an
optimal principal/agent contract, or limited by saliency and
outrage in accordance with the managerial power view of
corporate governance, the total value that can and will be
appropriated by managers will be a function of the number and
type of avenues through which value can be appropriated.
Although analysis of each of the corporate governance
mechanisms results in the same directional prediction, the
magnitude of the impact of expanding channels of appropriation
depends on which mechanism dominates. For example,
potential avenues of appropriation that are easily monitored
and under the unilateral control of the directors, such as
bonuses or perks, should have little effect on incremental
appropriation under the optimal contracting model, but could
have significant impact under the managerial power model. A
review of the relevant empirical literature suggests that
additional avenues of appropriation do indeed lead to greater
overall appropriation. The evidence, moreover, is largely
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valuable suggestions of Lucian Bebchuk, Keith Hylton, Steve Marks, Mike Meurer and
participants in workshops at Harvard Law School, Boston University School of Law, and the
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inconsistent with the optimal contracting view. This analysis
highlights a largely overlooked cost of compensation complexity:
In all likelihood, the increasing complexity and opacity of
executive compensation over the last two decades has
contributed to the overall increase in managerial appropriation.
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THE MANAGER'S SHARE
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance scholars sometimes argue that the total
share of corporate value that a manager can extract is independent
of the avenues through which value is extracted. Easterbrook and
Fischel put it this way:
Managers with the power to pay themselves can take their
profits once only. They can't take it in salary, and a second time
in options, and a third time in trading profits, and a fourth time
in perks. Grant that managers can wring so much from inves-
tors; then they will take it, and the division between trading
profits and skyboxes to football games matters only if the form
of compensation has efficiency properties.'
This Article challenges the idea that the manager's share is
fixed. Whether one views managerial appropriation as being capped
by external market forces, set by an optimal principal/agent
contract, or limited by saliency and outrage in accordance with the
managerial power view of corporate governance, the total value that
can and will be appropriated by managers of diffusely held public
companies2 will be a function of the number and type of avenues
through which value can be appropriated. To be sure, some avenues
of appropriation are less problematic under one model of corporate
governance than another, but the bottom line conclusion is the
same-channels of appropriation matter.
Resistance to the fixed slack argument is not novel. Many
commentators have approached various corporate governance
arrangements under the assumption that total appropriation
increases as channels of appropriation increase.' A primary
1. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 262 (1991). Easterbrook and Fischel are far from alone in this view. As
discussed in Part I, a number of respected scholars have made similar arguments.
2. My concern in this Article is with the governance of Berle-Means corporations
characterized by almost complete separation of ownership and control. See ADOLF A. BERLE,
JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). I am
not concerned with close corporations or other organizations in which managers may have
strong ownership incentives to monitor other managers.
3. See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate
Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999, 1023, 1033 (1981) (suggesting without explicit
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contribution of this Article, however, is to provide a rigorous
analysis of and rebuttal to the fixed appropriation view.
The mechanism that controls the manager's share of corporate
wealth is not perfectly understood. The optimal contracting model
of the managerial agency relationship posits that the principal (the
board of directors on behalf of the shareholders) can only imper-
fectly observe the effort, focus, and effectiveness of its agent (the
manager) and negotiates a contract that minimizes the resulting
agency costs, that is, the costs of (1) contracting with the manager,
(2) monitoring the manager's performance, (3) bonding by the
manager to maximize shareholder value, and (4) the residual slack
or divergence that remains between the actions selected by the
manager and those that would optimally benefit the shareholders.4
Recently, two colleagues and I have set forth a managerial power
theory of managerial slack that can be seen as supplementing the
optimal contracting theory.5 Under the managerial power theory,
appropriation by strong managers is limited by the outrage that
excessive appropriation causes among financial analysts, institu-
tional investors, and other corporate governance watchdogs.6
Outside directors are sensitive to this outrage, and limit managerial
compensation accordingly.7 As a result, managers have an incentive
to camouflage compensation in order to limit outrage.'
Under both of the aforementioned theories there is an overriding
cap on managerial value extraction that is determined by external
market forces-markets for corporate control, capital, products,
and even the managerial labor market. External market forces,
however, are generally thought to permit considerable slack,
explanation that managerial compensation arising from the taking of corporate opportunities
would be in addition to conventional compensation).
4. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976), discussed
infra Part III.
5. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753-61
(2002); see also LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
6. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 786-89.
7. Id. at 786-88.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
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leaving one to question the extent to which such forces actually
limit appropriation.9
Given the controversy concerning which mechanism actually
limits managerial appropriation, this Article considers the impact
of additional avenues of value appropriation under each theory. I
first analyze the external market forces that are viewed as placing
an upper bound on managerial appropriation and rendering
channels of appropriation irrelevant. If managerial labor and
takeover markets limited appropriation, and if these markets were
perfectly transparent and competitive, avenues of appropriation
would not affect a manager's overall share. Rational managers
would themselves select the most efficient compensation arrange-
ment in order to appropriate as much firm value as possible without
triggering market discipline. Managers would reject inefficient
compensation and would be forced to trade off equally efficient
forms dollar for dollar.' °
In reality, of course, markets are imperfect, and far from trans-
parent. But the fact that there is market slack only means that
managers are able to appropriate more under this model; it does not
mean that channels matter. Presumably, managers operating under
a slack market forces limitation would still maximize their share
and trade off one form of efficient compensation for another dollar
for dollar, albeit at a higher overall level. However, additional
opaque avenues of appropriation do affect total appropriation under
this model because each new opaque channel undermines the
effectiveness of these external market forces. Legalizing insider
trading, for example, would weaken managerial labor market
discipline and permit increased managerial appropriation because
private monitoring of insider trading would be difficult and costly."
Next, I consider the effect of additional appropriation channels
under the optimal contracting model. Stickiness in external market
forces suggests that there often will be a significant gap between the
minimum amount of compensation required to attract and retain a
manager-the reservation wage-and the external market forces
limitation on appropriation. Shareholders, or boards of directors
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
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acting for them, may be able to hold appropriation and agency costs
to a level below the external market forces limitation through
aggressive monitoring and the use of incentive compensation. The
optimal contracting model posits that shareholders will minimize
agency costs through this internal labor "market."'2
A simple thought experiment demonstrates why additional
avenues of appropriation lead to greater total appropriation under
the optimal contracting theory. First, imagine a case in which a
manager is paid with a mix of cash and options and has no opportu-
nity to extract pecuniary value through any other channel, e.g., has
no opportunity to engage in insider trading, self-dealing, or
appropriation of corporate opportunities; but the manager can enjoy
the private benefits of loafing and perquisites, which the directors
cannot perfectly observe. Under the optimal contracting theory, the
parties' contract would balance the manager's private benefit
opportunities, risk aversion, and the cost and effectiveness of
incentive compensation, and would optimize the mix of cash and
options, the level of monitoring, and the amount of residual slack.
Now add a new avenue of value appropriation. Imagine that self-
dealing becomes feasible. 3 Self-dealing can conceivably benefit
shareholders as well as managers, but because the incidence and
extent of value diversion through self-dealing cannot be perfectly
observed, self-dealing also can result in significant appropriation by
management. Thus, shareholders may wish to limit or even prohibit
self-dealing contractually, and a new optimal contract will be
written. The manager's share of firm value may increase in two
ways. First, the level of incentive compensation may increase in the
new environment. If the level of incentive compensation under the
old contract was optimal, it will not remain optimal in the new
environment because the manager has a new source of private
benefits that can be achieved through self-dealing and, unless
adjusted, no additional shareholder wealth-maximizing incentives.
Second, given diminishing returns on contracting and monitoring
investment, some excess self-dealing will be permitted under the
new optimal contract. Total agency costs will be higher in the
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. Self-dealing could become feasible through a change in legal rules or through a change
in corporate or individual circumstances.
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new environment, but these costs will be borne by the principal.
The manager-agent may benefit through enhanced incentive
compensation and residual self-dealing opportunities. 4
Finally, I consider the effect of additional channels of appropria-
tion under the managerial power model of corporate governance.
The managerial power model recognizes that directors are not
perfect agents of shareholders and presents a less optimistic view of
corporate behavior. Like the optimal contracting model, the
managerial power view posits that appropriation is only loosely
constrained by the external market forces discussed above. The
upper limit on appropriation under the managerial power view is
set not by optimal contracting, but by investor and financial press
outrage borne by outside directors. 5 Avoiding transparency and
salience is central to maximizing appropriation under this model.
Thus, it is a fairly straightforward implication of the managerial
power model that increasing the number of avenues of slack will
increase total managerial appropriation, because appropriation of
total value X through straight salary will be more salient and
outrageous than appropriation of the same amount through a
multiplicity of channels. However, certain channels of appropria-
tion, such as insider trading or perks, are more easily camouflaged
than others, such as straight salary. Thus, under this model, the
types of appropriation channels available to management may be as
or more important than the number of avenues available.'"
In sum, whether one believes that managerial appropriation is
capped by external market forces, by an optimized contract, or by
salience and outrage, increasing the avenues of appropriation
should increase the total value appropriated. This is an important
claim because if the fixed appropriation view is right and avenues
are irrelevant, there may be little or no reason to regulate insider
trading, self-dealing, or the taking of corporate opportunities. The
implication of additive appropriation, on the other hand, is that
total managerial appropriation is partly a function of the number
and types of appropriation avenues available.
14. See infra Part III.D.
15. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 786-87; infra Part IV.A.
16. See infra Part IV.B.
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There is a question of significance, however. Although analysis of
each of the corporate governance mechanisms results in the same
directional prediction, the factors affecting the magnitude of the
impact of additional avenues of appropriation on total appropriation
vary depending on the mechanism being considered.
Under the optimal contracting model, the important factors
include the difficulty of direct monitoring, the intensity of private
benefits, and the ability of directors to just say no. Avenues of
appropriation that can be eliminated by directorial fiat, such as
perks and benefits, should have little or no impact on total appropri-
ation under this model. Particularly troubling under the optimal
contracting model are avenues effectively under the control of the
managers, such as insider trading, self-dealing, and the taking of
corporate opportunities.17 Under the managerial power theory,
the key issues are the opacity of the value transferred through an
additional avenue of appropriation, which is similar but not
identical to monitoring difficulty, and the extent to which transfers
can be plausibly justified as enhancing shareholder value. The value
of certain complex benefit plans, for example, may be opaque to
outside observers but easily monitored by vigilant directors. Such
benefits present much more of an opportunity for incremental
appropriation under the managerial power model than the optimal
contracting model."8 If external market forces actually cap appropri-
ation, the extent to which an additional avenue of appropriation
undermines those forces is key, and difficulty of external monitoring
would again be important.19
Thus, one's level of concern with multiplying channels of manage-
rial appropriation may depend on which theory or mechanism one
believes best describes the contracting environment. As a corollary,
empirical evidence concerning the extent to which additional
avenues of appropriation add to total appropriation should shed
light on the persuasiveness of the various governance theories. This
Article analyzes numerous forms of current and potential value
appropriation through this lens and considers the limited empirical
evidence bearing on these issues.
17. See infra Part III.D.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part II.B.
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The empirical evidence supports the view that channels of
managerial appropriation matter. First, additional channels of
compensation lead to more total compensation. Second, the
additional compensation represents at least some appropriation of
shareholder value; it is not simply a fair and efficient splitting of
incremental firm value resulting from the inclusion of a share value-
enhancing form of compensation. Moreover, the evidence is largely
inconsistent with the optimal contracting model. Channels that
should lead to little or no incremental appropriation under this
model, because they are easily monitored and under the unilateral
control of the directors, significantly increase total appropriation.20
For example, a recent study of bonuses paid to executives for
completing acquisitions finds no relationship between deal perfor-
mance and the size of the bonus paid.2' These deal bonuses do not
appear to enhance shareholder value, and as a result, they should
not increase overall managerial appropriation under a fixed
appropriation view, or even under the optimal contracting model,
because they are easily monitored and the directors can eliminate
them if they are inefficient. The study finds, however, that these
bonuses do increase total appropriation; they do not simply replace
other forms of compensation.22 This result suggests that the
managerial power model better explains the deal bonus evidence
than the optimal contracting model.
So what is the upshot of this analysis and evidence? Taken
altogether, the primary contribution of this Article is to highlight a
largely overlooked cost of compensation complexity: In all likelihood,
the increasing complexity and opacity of executive compensation
over the last two decades has contributed directly to the overall
increase in managerial appropriation. This realization has obvious
implications for shareholders and policymakers. Shareholders and
their advocates should resist management attempts to pile on new
forms of compensation and perks; advocate simple, transparent pay
packages; and continue the push for more detailed and timely
disclosure of compensation, benefits, and perks. Lawmakers should
tread carefully when considering the deregulation of potential
20. See infra Part V.
21. See Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from
M&A Bonuses, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 120 (2004).
22. See id. at 127.
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channels of appropriation that are difficult to monitor and outside
the unilateral control of the directors, such as insider trading.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: Part I
describes the fixed appropriation view through examples of its
invocation and defines what I mean by the term "appropriation."
Part II presents and critiques the view that external market forces
cap total managerial appropriation and that, as a result, avenues of
appropriation are irrelevant. Part III considers the effect of
additional avenues of appropriation within the optimal contracting
framework assuming that boards of directors can improve upon the
limitation supplied by external market forces. Part IV provides the
same analysis under the managerial power view of corporate
governance arrangements. Part V considers the limited empirical
evidence bearing on the fixed appropriation question and the
governance theories discussed. Part VI briefly considers the
implications of this work.
I. THE FIXED APPROPRIATION VIEW AND APPROPRIATION DEFINED
Opponents of mandatory corporate law rules prohibiting certain
managerial activities, such as insider trading, self-dealing, or the
taking of corporate opportunities (or apologists for the lack of
such prohibitions), sometimes argue that the total share of corpo-
rate value that can be appropriated by a manager is fixed and
independent of the avenues through which value is appropriated.
Shareholders need not worry about an activity such as insider
trading, the story goes, because any profits achieved by a manager
through insider trading will simply offset salary, bonus, or other
forms of conventional compensation. This Part provides several
examples of the deployment of the fixed slack view and then, as a
preface to analysis of the effect of potential avenues of managerial
appropriation on total appropriation, defines exactly what is meant
by the term "appropriation."
A. The Fixed Appropriation Argument Deployed
The "fixed appropriation" or "fixed slack" argument has been
invoked in a variety of contexts. The Easterbrook and Fischel
passage quoted in the introduction is taken from their analysis of
[Vol. 47:587598
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the potential costs and benefits of deregulating insider trading;23
but, as the quotation suggests, it could apply to any avenue of
managerial appropriation. Salary, options, perks, and insider
trading just scratch the surface. In fact, in another article, the
authors make the same fixed appropriation argument in the context
of a manager appropriating a corporate opportunity.24
Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel also invoke the fixed slack
argument in their analysis of insider trading,25 as do David Haddock
and Jonathan Macey, who specifically focus on the role of the
managerial labor market in reducing other compensation for insider
trading gains.26 Economist Nejat Seyhun has summarized this
theory as follows: "In competitive managerial markets, potential
managers will incorporate the additional benefits of insider trading
into their wage contracts, thereby bidding their wages lower. 27
Einer Elhauge argues that contributions to a manager's pet
charities likely substitute for other forms of compensation and, thus,
do not erode shareholder value.28 His view is that managerial
discretion to make such contributions is unlikely to affect the overall
level of agency costs "because, although shareholders cannot
monitor specific operational decisions or determine whether
managers are maximizing profits, shareholders can and do monitor
the overall level of corporate profitability. 29
Albert Choi presents a theoretical model of golden parachute
arrangements that explains the devices as mechanisms for shifting
executive compensation from target firm shareholders onto
23. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 262.
24. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 734 (1982) ('Managers properly take opportunities for themselves when they
can exploit them more profitably than the firm.... [Trhe manager takes the venture, and the
firm reduces the manager's other compensation.").
25. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV. 857, 862-63 (1983) (arguing that managers and firms will allocate inside
information efficiently in the face of competitive markets).
26. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80
Nw. U. L. REv. 1449, 1461-62 (1986) (assuming that insider trading gains will be offset dollar
for dollar by salary reductions for risk-neutral, replaceable managers and by something less
than dollar for dollar reductions once risk aversion is factored into the analysis).
27. H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & ECON.
149, 150 (1992).
28. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 805-06 (2005).
29. Id. at 806.
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acquiring firms.3" The idea that shareholders can reduce traditional
executive compensation by the expected value of the parachute
payments is central to his argument.3 "
In criticizing the prohibition against executive loans under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,32 Roberta Romano argues that the
restriction will not reduce total compensation because "managers
can renegotiate their contracts to make up for the loss."33
These are just a few representative examples of analyses
predicated on a fixed appropriation view; many others can be found
in the corporate governance literature. Commentators propounding
this view, however, seldom develop the argument fully or discuss
the specific mechanism that they believe caps appropriation and
renders sources irrelevant.34 The next three Parts discuss three
mechanisms-external market forces, optimal contracting, and
outrage and saliency in accordance with the managerial power view
of corporate governance-that may limit managerial appropriation
and evaluates the fixed appropriation argument under each of them.
Before turning to these mechanisms, however, it is important to
define exactly what I mean by managerial appropriation.
B. Appropriation Defined
Defining "appropriation" is easy if firm value is unaffected by the
form of compensation provided to the manager, but the problem is
much more complex if, as Easterbrook and Fischel put it, various
forms of compensation have differing "efficiency properties."35 Let us
begin with the case in which corporate value is independent of the
30. See Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 170, 170 (2004).
31. Id. at 172.
32. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
33. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1538 (2005). Romano apparently believes that total
managerial utility derived from the corporation is fixed. She argues that the dollar value of
the manager's total compensation will likely be increased to make up for the loss of preferred,
but now prohibited, executive loans. Id. at 1539.
34. David Haddock and Jonathan Macey's analysis of insider trading is an exception. See
Haddock & Macey, supra note 26, at 1461 (arguing that managerial labor market competition
would drive down an insider's direct compensation to reflect profits achieved through insider
trading).
35. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 262.
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form of compensation. Then, if a manager receives more total
compensation as a result of being offered a new form of compensa-
tion, the increase represents incremental appropriation. This is a
zero-sum, fixed economic "pie" situation, so any incremental gain by
the manager represents a transfer from the shareholders.
The analysis is more complicated if a new form of compensation
provides share value-enhancing incentives or tax savings or
otherwise results in a larger pie. Now the fact that a manager gains
does not necessarily imply that the shareholders lose. The manager
and shareholders may be dividing the incremental gains. Does this
mean that shareholders should not worry about the manager's share
of incremental gains from new forms of compensation as long as
the shareholders remain whole? No. Although it is more difficult
to define appropriation in this scenario, I would argue that, at a
minimum, incremental appropriation occurs whenever managers
capture 100% of incremental gains or managers fail to "pay" for the
low risk elements of new compensation.
There are several ways that one might think about incremental
appropriation in the "growing pie" scenario. One might compare the
percentage of firm value received by a manager before and after the
introduction of a new value-enhancing compensation mechanism,
but this is arbitrary because there was nothing sacred about the
original sharing of firm value. But if the manager receives 100% of
incremental firm value resulting from the adoption of a new form of
compensation, then she has at least appropriated the entire
opportunity, although the shareholders are no worse off. We cannot
say anything about the degree of incremental appropriation in this
scenario, however, for the reason given above.
Nonetheless, there is one "growing pie" scenario in which we can
comfortably define and test for incremental appropriation. Suppose
a manager initially receives only a cash salary of 100. Now suppose
that the manager is offered a bonus based on company performance.
Under the bonus formula, company performance will be assessed as
'low," "medium," or "high," and the associated bonus will be 10, 30,
or 50, respectively. Because the manager is guaranteed a bonus of
10, she should be willing to give up at least this amount of salary in
exchange for the bonus opportunity. Under the optimal contracting
framework discussed in Part III, we would expect the directors to
2005]
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require the manager to give up at least this amount.36 Thus, if there
is no adjustment to the manager's base salary in this scenario, we
can define the overlapping risk-free compensation to be incremental
managerial appropriation.
A "fixed pie" assumption appears to underlie the fixed appropria-
tion literature, and I will generally assume that additional avenues
of appropriation have no effect on firm value as I analyze the
impact of these avenues on overall managerial appropriation in the
next several Parts. As we have seen, defining appropriation in this
context is noncontroversial. Incremental managerial compensation
equals incremental appropriation. In Part V, however, I will relax
the fixed pie constraint and consider whether the empirical evidence
points to incremental appropriation with respect to arguably value-
enhancing compensation.
II. THE EXTERNAL MARKET FORCES LIMITATION AND
FIXED APPROPRIATION
This Part first develops the external market forces limitation
argument and then discusses various objections that can be levied
against it. I show that market forces would cap total managerial
appropriation and render channels of appropriation irrelevant if
managerial labor and corporate control markets were perfectly
competitive and transparent. However, given imperfect markets,
high transaction costs, and in particular, opacity, this Part demon-
strates that the number and type of avenues of appropriation that
are available directly impact external market forces limitations on
appropriation and that additional avenues generally undermine the
discipline of market forces and lead to increased total appropriation.
36. In brief, the optimal contracting model assumes that the principal (the directors on
behalf of the shareholders) minimizes agency costs, including the cost of managerial
compensation. Agency costs exceed the manager's reservation wage because the directors
cannot perfectly observe the manager's effort or focus. As a result, the directors invest in
monitoring and accept a certain amount of residual slack. Under this model, however, the
directors can offer the manager a package including the bonus and reduced salary, and, under
these assumptions, even the most risk-averse manager would accept the package.
[Vol. 47:587602
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A. The External Market Forces Limitation Argument
Four market forces have been described that tend to limit
managerial appropriation of shareholder value-managerial
labor, corporate control, capital, and products markets.3" Judge
Easterbrook sees these markets disciplining managers "almost as
if there were an invisible hand."38 I will focus primarily on the
managerial labor and corporate control markets, as these are the
most plausible external market mechanisms for limiting managerial
appropriation.
Imagine an industry that is highly competitive along many
dimensions-an industry marked by fierce product and labor
competition (including competition for executive services) and
competition for capital. Imagine that control contests are inexpen-
sive and frequently launched. Imagine that managerial compensa-
tion is transparent. In such an imaginary industry,39 market forces
would limit managerial appropriation even if corporate directors
provided no discipline at all.
1. Managerial Labor Market (Reputation)
A perfectly transparent and competitive managerial labor market
in which managerial talent is fungible would provide a cap on
appropriation that would render channels of appropriation irrele-
vant in the manner suggested by Easterbrook and Fischel. Suppose
that a manager, given her appetite for risk, is willing to accept a pay
37. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 543, 557 (1984); Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The
Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61, 87-101 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256-57, 262-73 (1977).
38. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 544.
39. I am unaware of any industry that fully fits this description. The computer industry
often exhibits fierce product competition, but as the recent Oracle contest for PeopleSoft
suggests, control contests are not always easy or inexpensive in that industry. See David
Bank, After 18-Month Battle, Oracle Finally Wins Over PeopleSoft, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2004,
at Al (noting that hostile acquisition required eighteen months to complete and an increase
in price of 66%). The airline industry is marked by cutthroat product competition as well, but
executive compensation in that industry is not particularly transparent. Compensation is
probably most transparent in regulated utilities, but utilities are generally insulated from
control contests and strong product competition.
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package including fixed salary of Xand incentive compensation with
expected value Y If the manager attempts to appropriate additional
compensation of Z through a new channel, the directors can simply
refuse or they can reduce her salary to reflect the unbargained-for
appropriation. If the manager persists and refuses to renegotiate,
the directors can replace her with a comparable manager.4 ° As a
result, the manager could not increase her overall share of corporate
value by exploiting the new channel of appropriation.
Suppose, however, that the manager is insulated from being fired
from her present position or having her compensation adjusted. A
perfectly competitive labor market would still impose this level of
discipline on the manager and render channels of appropriation
irrelevant, as long as the manager had ambitions beyond her
present position or was likely to reenter the labor market for any
reason.4 In a competitive labor market, a manager who appropri-
ates excessive compensation as CEO of ABC Co. through uncon-
ventional channels would find the conventional compensation
offered to her by XYZ Co. reduced accordingly.42 The prospect of this
ex post settling up would induce a rational manager to limit
appropriation of shareholder value during her tenure as CEO of
ABC Co. Ultimately, this is a story about reputation, and taken to
an extreme implies that no explicit measures are needed to
discipline managers.43
40. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 557.
41. There would be a final period problem under this model. If discipline derives solely
from the prospect of new employment, a manager nearing retirement would not be deterred
from utilizing additional channels of appropriation to increase her total share. See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 169.
42. See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 94 (summarizing Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980)). In a less than perfectly
competitive labor market, the effect can be reversed for several reasons: First, XYZ Co. may
be forced to match or better the compensation, explicit or implicit, received by the CEO of
ABC Co. to lure her away. Thus, greater total compensation at ABC may lead to greater total
compensation at XYZ. Second, greater appropriation by ABC's CEO may serve as an
(inaccurate) signal of quality. Third, given the reliance on executive compensation
benchmarks, increased appropriation by ABC's CEO and others like her may lead to a
ratcheting up of executive compensation across the board. See John M. Bizjak et al., Has the
Use of Peer Groups Contributed to Higher Levels of Executive Compensation? 1-2 (Nov. 15,
2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=252544 (describing and
providing evidence of the ratcheting phenomena).
43. See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 94.
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This essentially external, reputational mechanism should be
distinguished from internal levers, such as incentive compensation
and opportunities for promotion, which also provide labor market
discipline. The power of these internal forces depends on the
strength of internal corporate governance, which I discuss in
presenting the optimal contracting and managerial power models in
Parts III and IV.
2. The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is seen as disciplining manage-
rial appropriation in a similar fashion. In a perfectly functioning
and transparent market, managerial appropriation would be fully
reflected in a company's share price. Any deviation of the share
price from the optimal level would create an arbitrage opportunity
for competing managers who could initiate a control contest and
replace existing management." Thus, managers that failed to
maximize shareholder value, either through poor decision making
or through appropriating an excessive portion of the pie, would face
an external risk, even if the company's directors imposed no
discipline.
Channels of appropriation would be largely irrelevant in the
face of an ideal takeover market. If the share value-maximizing
managerial compensation package consists of salary of X and
incentive compensation of Y, a manager who appropriated an
additional amount Z through an unconventional channel would
have to give up other compensation or face the risk of ouster. Judge
Easterbrook envisions teams of potential managers monitoring
existing managers looking for these arbitrage opportunities.45
Knowing that they are being watched and are at risk of losing
control through a tender offer or proxy contest, incumbent manag-
ers, he believes, tend to act in the shareholders' interests.46
44. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 564; Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom"
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L.
REv. 913, 919 (1982); Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 97; Winter, supra note 37, at 264-
66; see also Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112-13 (1965) (generally credited with originating this idea).
45. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 564.
46. See id.; Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 97.
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3. Capital and Products Markets
The capital and products markets could further assist in capping
overall managerial appropriation and rendering channels of
appropriation irrelevant. Takeovers aside, capital markets play a
separate role in disciplining managers. Managers that must enter
the capital markets to raise funds will find that poor performance
or excessive appropriation, or the risk thereof, raises their cost of
capital. This effect provides discipline for a going concern if it
envisions raising new capital,47 and also for a new firm. According
to Judge Easterbrook, managers that are taking a firm public will
attempt to bond themselves to reasonable appropriation in order to
reduce the cost of capital.4"
Finally, products markets may impose some discipline on
managers.49 If managerial slack results in poorer performance in the
market for a company's products, bankruptcy may ensue, which
would leave the manager without a job and with an unfavorable
reputation. Even short of bankruptcy, lack of competitiveness in
products markets hurts share value, increasing the risk of takeover,
and reducing the amount of firm value available for managerial
appropriation.5"
B. Objections to the Market Forces Limitation Argument
A number of objections can be raised to the argument that market
forces limit managerial appropriation and that avenues of appro-
priation are irrelevant. The most common objection is that these
markets are not perfectly competitive, leaving managers with
significant slack. While true, this observation does not fully rebut
the "fixed appropriation" argument. If imperfections in these
markets allow managers to appropriate more than they would under
a perfect market assumption, managers can be expected to push
compensation to the limits permitted by these slack markets. At this
point, however, further appropriation would trigger the discipline
47. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 556; Winter, supra note 37, at 257; see also
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 6, 213.
48. Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 543.
49. See id. at 557; Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 95.
50. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 543, 557.
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of the external market forces and bring us back to the fixed
appropriation result. Thus, a more nuanced rebuttal is required.
The Easterbrook and Fischel passage suggests that avenues
of appropriation matter if there are efficiency differences.51
Presumably, they mean that if one form of appropriation provides
share value-enhancing incentives while another does not, the
choice of compensation affects managerial and shareholder wealth.
If appropriation were transparent, however, efficiency differences
would have little effect. External market forces would cause
managers to select the most efficient compensation package in order
to maximize appropriation. Efficiency does matter under a market
forces limitation model, but only in an evolutionary sense. The
invention of a more efficient form of compensation, such as stock
options, increases the pie available for both managers and share-
holders. In a static analysis, however, inefficient forms of appropria-
tion should be squeezed out under this model.
Although efficiency is something of a red herring under this
model, opacity is not. Once we relax the assumption that appropria-
tion is transparent, it can be readily demonstrated that additional
avenues of appropriation generally undermine the effectiveness of
external market forces and increase the total appropriation
permitted by these forces even if a new channel is no more ineffi-
cient (or opaque) than an existing channel.
1. Imperfect Markets Result in Significant Slack
Markets are sticky. Replacing a manager means incurring
search and training costs. Raiders are required to offer a significant
premium to market price to wrest control from management. As a
result, the market forces "cap" on managerial appropriation is
barely a cap at all. These are the conventional responses to the
market forces argument, and, to be fair, proponents of deregulation
recognize that markets are imperfect. Judge Easterbrook, for
example, has written that "[n]one of the competitive devices is
costless or perfect. Indeed, all are quite costly, and all together leave
room for occasional fraud and managerial slack."52
51. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 262.
52. Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 542.
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It is instructive to examine the sources of slack resulting from
imperfect market discipline. The limitation on appropriation arising
from the managerial labor market depends in part on the cost of
replacing the manager. 3 If the manager has a great deal of firm-
specific knowledge that will be difficult for a replacement to acquire
or if search costs are high, the cost of replacing him will be high and
slack will be significant. Of course, managerial performance as well
as appropriation factors into the replacement decision. Difficulties
in monitoring and evaluating performance further muddy the signal
and generally weaken the discipline of this market.
More generally, one can question the efficiency of the managerial
labor market, particularly the CEO labor market. An efficient
market requires many buyers and sellers engaged in fairly anony-
mous, independent transactions. 54 The CEO market, by contrast, is
thin. The number of candidates that a Fortune 500 firm would
consider in a CEO search would be few,55 and the number of
openings each year, although perhaps growing, is few as well.56
Rakesh Khurana argues that CEO search committees often become
obsessed with attracting a particular candidate, which undermines
efficient bargaining.57 Moreover, the CEO selection process is
subject to a great deal of internal political and social pressure, and
boards of directors of major companies (and CEO candidates) have
to be extremely careful with regard to secrecy and confidentiality,
factors which further impair the efficiency of this market.58
Slack in the discipline provided by the market for corporate
control also is a function of cost. Takeovers are expensive. In recent
years, takeover premia have averaged 30% or more.59 But this figure
53. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 328-29.
54. See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST
FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs 27 (2002).
55. See id. at 27-28.
56. See Mark R. Huson et al., Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A
Long-Term Perspective, 56 J. FIN. 2265, 2275 (2001) (finding a modest increase in CEO
turnover in large public companies between 1971 and 1994 from 10.7% annually to 11.2%
annually, but finding a noticeable increase in forced successions); see also Kevin J. Murphy,
Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2549 (Orley
Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (noting an increase in external replacement of CEOs).
57. See KHURANA, supra note 54, at 180.
58. See id. at 32-48.
59. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted"
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 908 (1988) (citing two studies
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probably underestimates the amount of slack allowed by the
takeover market, because a new owner would face agency costs as
well.6" He cannot run the firm by himself. Thus, appropriation
representing a deviation of, say, 30% of firm value over some
"normal' level of agency costs and slack would be needed to justify
a takeover.
Several factors limit the disciplining force of capital markets.
Judge Easterbrook suggests that the prospect of an IPO will cause
managers to bond themselves in the company charter to reasonable
appropriation.61 But even if this is so, the force of this discipline is
likely to wane over time as changes in legal rules and the business
environment open up new avenues of appropriation.62
But what about subsequent trips to the capital markets? Won't
the prospect of having to raise new money provide discipline? No,
not to a significant extent. First, the cost of issuing new debt will be
increased only to the extent that excess appropriation is large
enough to affect a company's risk of insolvency and debt rating.63
from the 1980s reporting takeover premia in excess of 50%); Thomas Moeller, Let's Make a
Deal! How Shareholder Control Impacts Merger Payoffs, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 167, 172-74 (2005)
(finding average takeover premia of 30.8% for a sample of completed U.S. transactions of $100
million or more that were announced during the 1990s); Lisa K. Muelbroek & Carolyn Hart,
The Effect of Illegal Insider Trading on Takeover Premia, 1 EUR. FIN. REV. 51, 53-54, 61-62
(1997) (finding average takeover premia of 32.5% for a sample of acquisitions occurring in the
1980s for which illegal insider trading was not detected and an average premia of 43.1% for
a matched set of firms with detected insider trading). But see Jay C. Hartzell et al., What's In
It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 41-43 (2004) (reporting
average takeover premia ranging from 22.7% to 34.8%, depending on the metric, for a sample
of large U.S. deals announced during the late 1990s).
60. See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 97 (asking: "Why would the new
management behave any better than the old one?").
61. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 543-44.
62. In fact, the prospect of a changing business and legal environment will make it very
difficult for a manager to bond himself to reasonable appropriation ex ante without imposing
significant costs on the company. It will be difficult for a manager to tie his own hands
without tying up the company as well and risking foregoing profitable business opportunities.
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 325.
63. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1466 (1992). But see Naveen D.
Daniel et al., The Hidden Cost of Managerial Incentives: Evidence from the Bond and Stock
Markets (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=612921
(finding that firms that use more powerful incentive compensation incur greater debt costs
that are not offset by reductions in executive perk consumption or selection of higher-risk,
positive-net present value projects; thus, share value suffers as a result of high-powered,
suboptimal incentives).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Managerial appropriation is more a question of dividing the pie
between managers and shareholders. Second, because mature
public companies rarely make equity offerings, 4 a company's cost of
equity capital is unlikely to be affected by midstream increases in
managerial appropriation. Finally, even if a firm makes a later trip
to the public equity market or suffers an increase in its cost of debt,
any additional cost of capital is borne by the shareholders pro rata,
not by the manager alone.
5
Products markets seem a very remote mechanism for imposing
discipline on managerial appropriation. First, excessive managerial
appropriation may not have any bearing on a firm's success in the
products markets.66 Some avenues of appropriation, such as
managerial self-dealing or the taking of corporate opportunities
could conceivably impact competitiveness, but most will not.67 In
addition, the incremental risk of bankruptcy resulting from
excessive managerial appropriation generally will be slight.
The foregoing discussion suggests that external market forces
will often permit a significant degree of slack.8 But showing that
there is slack in the market forces limitations does not sufficiently
rebut the fixed appropriation claim. Avenues of slack could still be
irrelevant to total managerial appropriation whether external
forces working perfectly limit the total to X or working imperfectly
limit appropriation to X + Y If market forces cap appropriation at
some level, channels conceivably could be irrelevant to total
appropriation.
64. Equity offerings made subsequent to IPOs, known as seasoned equity offerings, are
rare because they are viewed in the market as a signal of bad news and "last resort" financing.
See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 418-19
(7th ed. 2003).
65. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 778.
66. See id.
67. See Bebchuk, supra note 63, at 1466-67.
68. In addition to these arguments, Lucian Bebchuk argues persuasively that managers
will not be constrained by external market forces with respect to significantly redistributive
issues, such as compensation. See id. With respect to these issues, managers are likely to
accept the small risk of takeover or ouster associated with a dollar for dollar transfer of value
from shareholders to managers. See id. at 1461-67.
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2. Efficiency Differences Affect Appropriation (But Only in an
Evolutionary Sense)
Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that sources of appropriation
affect shareholder and manager wealth if there are differences
in "efficiency properties." 9 The idea, presumably, is that some
forms of appropriation, such as stock options, create share value-
enhancing incentives, while others, perhaps skyboxes, do not,
and that given efficiency differences, the choice of compensation
matters. Under the assumption of perfect markets and transparent
compensation, however, efficiency properties would only affect
total managerial appropriation in an evolutionary sense. At any
time, external market forces would cause managers both to limit
their appropriation and to select the most efficient form or forms of
appropriation.
Suppose, for example, that the takeover market effectively caps
CEO compensation at ABC Co. and that the CEO presently receives
100% incentive compensation with value of 20, producing net
shareholder value of 100. If shareholder value falls below 100, a
takeover will ensue. Now suppose the CEO has access to perks
worth 5 and that these perks represent a pure value transfer from
the shareholders. If the CEO takes the perks in addition to his
current level of incentive compensation, share value falls to 95,
triggering a takeover. In order to take perks and avoid triggering a
takeover, the CEO must reduce his incentive compensation, but that
also reduces firm value. Suppose reducing his incentive compensa-
tion to 15 produces net firm value of 103 prior to taking the perks.
The CEO could then take 3 in perks and maintain net shareholder
value of 100. But, of course, the CEO's total compensation is
reduced to 18. More generally, an external market forces limitation
on managerial appropriation would cause the executive to select the
most efficient appropriation arrangement in order to maximize
appropriation.7 °
69. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 262.
70. The manager would maximize his utility, not his income, but it is unlikely that a
manager would value perks equally with cash compensation. Because cash can be used to
purchase anything, including perks, the cash equivalent should always be more valuable to
the manager. See M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of
Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption 15, 28 (John M. Olin Law & Econ.
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On the other hand, even given assumptions of perfect markets
and transparency, changes in legal rules or evolution in compensa-
tion technology involving efficiency differences would affect the
manager's share over time. First, imagine an environment in which
incentive compensation is prohibited by law and firms offer only
straight salary compensation. Now imagine that all constraints are
lifted and companies begin offering stock and option incentives.
Because incentive compensation is riskier than salary and
managers generally are risk averse, companies would have to offer
packages with greater expected value to induce managers to make
the switch.7' But assuming incentive compensation is effective in
increasing shareholder wealth, paying managers more through
incentive compensation could be attractive. Shareholders could
benefit in two ways. First, existing managers would react to
incentive compensation by working harder, being more creative, or
taking greater risks. Second, individuals with the appropriate skills
and risk preferences would migrate towards these jobs. For both
reasons, as Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy point out, "[p]aying
CEOs 'better' would eventually mean paying the average CEO
more."
72
Of course, one could respond that the markets force firms and
managers to adopt the most efficient compensation package given
existing compensation technology and legal rules and that increased
managerial remuneration in this scenario is not necessarily
"appropriation" as I have defined it, because the change enhances
share value. And I agree. My point here, however, is simply to
suggest that within a market forces framework, evolution in legal
rules or technology can indeed result in managers taking their
profits once in salary and a second time in options.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 221, 2004), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
LaweconNWkngPprs_201-25/221-mth-jcs-heroin-new.pdf (recognizing that perks generally will
be discounted by executives but proposing that, in certain circumstances, perks could be worth
more than their cash equivalent because mental accounting allows an executive to enjoy a
perk that he would not be willing to purchase with cash).
71. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 713, 722-23 (1995).
72. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives--It's Not How Much You Pay,
But How, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 139.
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3. Opaque Appropriation Undermines Market Discipline
The most problematic assumption relied upon in concluding that
an external market forces limitation on appropriation would
render channels of appropriation irrelevant is not that avenues are
equally efficient, but that they are transparent. Generally, they
are not. Additional avenues of appropriation-particularly opaque
appropriation-undermine the discipline imposed by external
market forces and result in greater total managerial appropriation
under a more nuanced analysis. This effect has little to do with
efficiency.
Suppose, for example, that taking perks and self-dealing both
represent dollar for dollar transfers from shareholders to managers
and that the two avenues are equally (in)efficient in terms of
increasing shareholder wealth. According to Easterbrook and
Fischel, whether a manager appropriates value X through taking
perks, self-dealing, or a combination of both is a matter of indiffer-
ence to shareholders.73 Shareholders will not be indifferent,
however, if access to an additional avenue of appropriation under-
mines the discipline provided by market forces.
Legal prohibitions provide extracontractual enforcement mecha-
nisms and sanctions that can reduce the cost to a company or to the
markets of monitoring managerial behavior.74 Many of the avenues
of appropriation that are (or formerly were) prohibited under
mandatory corporate law, such as insider trading and self-dealing,
are difficult to monitor directly. The value appropriated is not
transparent.
Imagine that insider trading is legalized, that some companies
choose to regulate or even prohibit the practice contractually while
others do nothing, and that managers increase appropriation via
this channel generally. How will this affect market discipline? The
managerial labor market will not work as effectively as it did prior
to revocation of the prohibition. Given relaxed sanctions (firing only
73. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 262.
74. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81, 90-95 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser
eds., 1985) (arguing that the failure of companies to prohibit insider trading contractually
tells us little because of the costs and limitations of private monitoring and enforcement, but
that public monitoring and enforcement may be optimal).
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versus firing, jail, and fines), managers will be tempted to disguise
their trades and violate contractual rules prohibiting or limiting
insider trading.75 It will be more difficult for both internal and
external monitors to determine how much a given manager is
appropriating in total. Hidden appropriation has no effect on a
manager's reputation. All else being equal, the cap on total appro-
priation imposed by the managerial labor market is raised with the
introduction of a new channel of value appropriation that is opaque
and difficult to monitor.
The discipline offered by the takeover, capital, and products
markets will be undermined as well. First, reduced compensation
transparency undermines the effectiveness of the takeover market
just as it does the managerial labor market. If a takeover would be
triggered by excessive managerial compensation, hiding some of
that compensation makes it more difficult for potential acquirers to
identify promising targets. It might be argued that executive
compensation, even if opaque, is reflected in a company's share
price, and that it is share price and not compensation per se that
triggers takeovers. If the first assertion is true, however, one must
ask why companies fought so vigorously against new accounting
rules requiring stock option compensation to be subtracted from
reported earnings rather than simply footnoted. 76 Assuming
imperfect markets, obscured compensation is likely to undermine
the discipline offered by the market for corporate control.
Even if a new channel of appropriation has little direct effect on
the effectiveness of the takeover market, an avenue that is opened
up by removal of a legal prohibition has a second, across-the-board
effect on appropriation. All companies face the same change in
environment and roughly the same increase in monitoring costs.
The management team put in place by a successful raider will face
the same temptation to trade on inside information, for example.77
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., David I. Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap,
96 TAX NOTES 851, 853 (2002) (describing industry and congressional pressure on the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to refrain from adopting a mandatory option expensing
rule). The obvious implication is that many executives do not believe the markets are
sufficiently efficient to fully incorporate footnoted information. An alternative explanation is
that managers are protecting compensation that is tied to accounting results rather than
stock price, although, again, this explanation relies on an imperfect labor market view.
77. See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 97.
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All firms in the capital markets and products markets face similar
increases in managerial appropriation. This is the dark side of the
changes-in-legal-rules idea discussed above. Even if market forces
fix appropriation within a given set of legal rules and business
environment, all bets are off when the rules or environment
changes.
Of course, difficulty of monitoring or opacity could be considered
part of the "efficiency properties" alluded to in Easterbrook and
Fischel's caveat. However, the problem discussed here is not a
function of differences in opacity or monitoring difficulty. Each
new avenue of appropriation adds to the monitoring burden faced
by shareholders and markets and further undermines market
discipline. Even if a current channel and potential new channel of
appropriation are similar in opacity, they likely will present
separate monitoring challenges and will have additive, negative
impacts on market discipline. The effects of insider trading and
self-dealing on managerial appropriation might be similar in
magnitude, for example, but efforts spent in directly monitoring
insider trading may have little impact on self-dealing and vice
versa, and determining appropriation via these two avenues will be
independent problems.
Market forces certainly play a role in constraining managerial
appropriation and in some cases may cause channels of appropria-
tion to be irrelevant. The question is how hard or how often these
constraints "bite." If two channels of appropriation are already
open and are currently being utilized, it probably makes little
difference if a manager appropriates a little more via avenue A and
less via B. However, if one avenue represents a change in compen-
sation technology or legal rules or if a new avenue is opened that
undermines the discipline of the markets, managers may indeed
increase their total appropriation under this model. Opacity appears
to be the most important determinant of the extent to which an
additional channel of appropriation is likely to increase total
managerial appropriation if external market forces actually set the
cap.
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III. EFFECT OF ADDITIONAL AVENUES OF APPROPRIATION WITHIN
THE OPTIMAL CONTRACTING FRAMEWORK
Whether or not market discipline is affected by avenues of slack,
all observers recognize that there is slack in market discipline. This
Part examines the effect of additional avenues of appropriation on
a manager's overall share of firm value under the optimal contract-
ing framework, assuming that this mechanism actually limits
managerial appropriation. The optimal contracting model assumes
that the principal (here the shareholders or the board of directors)
minimizes agency costs and maximizes shareholder value by
minimizing the sum of the costs of contracting, monitoring, bonding,
and residual loss. The optimal contracting model predicts that
the manager's share of firm value generally increases with the
creation or deregulation of opaque avenues of appropriation that are
largely under the control of the executives themselves, e.g., insider
trading, self-dealing, or taking corporate opportunities. Avenues of
appropriation that can be eliminated by directorial fiat should have
little or no effect on total appropriation under this model.
A. The Optimal Contracting Model of Managerial Compensation
This Part follows Jensen and Meckling's optimal contracting
theory of managerial agency costs in analyzing the impact of
additional avenues of managerial appropriation."v The analysis
begins with a sole proprietor-manager who sells shares of equity
to nonmanaging outsiders, which creates a wedge between the
manager's private incentives and the incentives of the shareholders
generally. v9 The outside shareholders cannot perfectly, or costlessly,
observe the manager's effort or focus, and performance results are
not completely within the manager's control.' Thus, the sharehold-
ers cannot ensure perfect fidelity to their objectives, and the
manager, who now owns less than 100% of the cash flow rights, will
tend to consume excessive perks, loaf, and otherwise extract private
benefits, because he enjoys 100% of the benefit of such activities,
78. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4.
79. See id. at 312.
80. See id.; see also Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO
LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
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but only a fraction of the cost, which is borne pro rata by all
shareholders.
Agency costs under this model are defined as the sum of (1)
monitoring costs incurred by the principal, (2) bonding costs
incurred by the manager-agent to better ensure loyalty to share-
holder wealth maximization, and (3) the cost of the residual
divergence between the manager's actual decisions and shareholder
wealth-maximizing decisions."' The costs involved in designing and
negotiating the manager's contract should be added to this list, as
well. The optimal contract would minimize the sum of these agency
costs. Jensen and Meckling assumed that increases in monitoring
reduce the residual loss, but do so at a decreasing rate; in other
words, incremental investment in monitoring produces diminishing
returns.8 Under this assumption, we would expect some divergence
of goals and some residual loss under the optimal contract.
More specifically, contracting and monitoring costs include all
agency costs incurred directly by the principal. These include the
costs of writing compensation contracts and other rules and
procedures to limit an executive's access to private benefits; the
costs of monitoring and enforcing such rules, contracts, and
procedures; and, importantly, the cost of incentive compensation,
which, under this model, is just another tool for minimizing total
agency costs." Residual loss or slack represents the divergence
between the manager's actions and shareholder wealth-maximizing
actions. The residual loss could consist of management shirking,84
pursuing only low risk opportunities," taking excessive perquisites,
making corporate contributions to pet charities, or otherwise
extracting private benefits through insider trading, self-dealing,
taking corporate opportunities, etc.
81. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 308.
82. See id. at 323.
83. See id.
84. Loafing in the executive suite may not represent a significant shareholder concern in
large, public companies, but shareholders should be concerned about the amount of a
manager's time and attention devoted to maximizing shareholder wealth versus the amount
devoted to managing the manager's own portfolio, maximizing executive compensation,
minimizing personal taxes, etc.
85. Diversified shareholders are essentially risk neutral, but executives are typically risk
averse because their human capital and often a disproportionate share of their financial
capital are invested in the firm.
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It is worth emphasizing that the agency costs in this model also
result from a lack of transparency. If the shareholders could observe
the manager's effort and the impact of the manager on performance
results perfectly and costlessly, there would be no agency costs.
With perfect transparency, a contract could be designed that would
ensure managerial fidelity to shareholder objectives. Essentially,
the manager would be paid or retained if he took shareholder-
regarding actions; otherwise he would not be. 6 As a result, the
manager would take shareholder-regarding actions. In the real
world, however, actions and results are never this transparent. 7
B. Optimal Compensation Exceeds Lower Bound on the
Manager's Share
The floor on the manager's share is set by the amount required to
attract and retain the manager-his reservation wage. This amount
is determined by the manager's other opportunities. But this
amount should not be thought of as optimal compensation. A firm
may wish to pay its manager more than this minimum in order to
create incentives to increase firm value. 8 An example may help
clarify this point. Imagine an idealized firm owned and managed by
a single individual (M) who maximizes his own utility. Suppose firm
value in this situation is 100. Now imagine that M sells 99% of the
equity to an outside shareholder (S!-). Suppose SH agrees to pay M
his reservation wage, a fixed amount of compensation with present
value equal to 10. SH monitors M's performance through quarterly
board meetings and audits, at a cost of 5, but cannot perfectly
observe M's level of effort or the advisability of M's management
decisions. M may worry about retaining his position, but clearly
his incentive to maximize firm value is reduced. For every dollar of
firm value he adds/squanders, he enjoys/suffers only one cent.
Meanwhile, his compensation is fixed. Thus, loafing and perk
consumption (of which he enjoys 100%) will increase at the expense
of firm value. 9 Suppose the value of the company in this scenario
86. See Posner, supra note 80, at 227.
87. Managerial risk aversion plays a role in the creation of agency costs as well. See id.
88. See James A. Mirrlees, The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an
Organization, 7 BELL J. ECON. 105, 108 (1976).
89. As Jensen and Meckling point out, agency costs are borne by the owner/manager when
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falls to 50, implying a residual loss of 50 (100 minus 50) and total
agency costs of 65, including monitoring costs and M's compensa-
tion. SH enjoys net value of 35; M receives 10.90
Now imagine that the parties negotiate an incentive compensa-
tion contract under which M and SH divide firm value in excess of
50.91 Mnow has a much stronger incentive to maximize shareholder
value and reduce perks and loafing. Essentially, the cost of perks
and loafing rises from one cent on the dollar to fifty cents on the
dollar, so perk consumption and loafing will be reduced. Because M
does not bear 100% of the costs of perk consumption and loafing,
however, he will not work as hard and will consume more perks
than he did in the sole proprietor case. Suppose that firm value in
this scenario is 80. Although M's compensation increases to 25, total
agency costs are reduced to 50 because of the large reduction in
residual loss. Thus, SH enjoys net value of 50.92 Note also that while
M's compensation has increased from 10 to 25 under the incentive
compensation scheme, the increase in his utility is less because he
has cut back on perks and loafing."s
he sells shares to third parties. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 313. Thus, Mhas the
incentive in this case to minimize agency costs. This does not mean, however, that Mwill not
maximize his private benefits once the shares are sold.
90. To simplify the numbers, I ignore M's 1% of residual firm value here and throughout.
91. The ideal incentive for an agent is one that directly encourages him to maximize the
principal's objective function, here firm value. Holmstrom and Milgrom have shown that
where agents have multiple tasks, high-powered incentives related to one task can be
counterproductive if the other tasks are difficult to monitor. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul
Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job
Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 24, 27-28 (1991). Tying a manager's
compensation to share value should solve this problem, however, as long as markets are
reasonably efficient and managers cannot game share value.
92. SH net value is calculated as follows: 80 (firm value) minus 5 (direct monitoring)
minus 10 (salary) minus 15 (incentive compensation). I again ignore M's 1% shareholding for
simplicity.
93. Although the optimal compensation package offered to a risk-neutral manager might
consist solely of incentive compensation, such a package is unlikely to be ideal for the typical
manager. A fixed salary component serves as insurance for a risk-averse or wealth-
constrained manager. Thus, while we might expect the fixed salary component of an optimal
incentive compensation contract to be less than that of an optimal contract lacking incentive
compensation, we would not expect it to be zero in the former case. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk
& Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
487 (1999) (providing a model of managerial value diversion in which shareholders provide
managers with the minimum amount of fixed salary compatible with their wealth
constraints); David E.M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 45, 63 (1991) (noting that fixed salary serves as insurance against market influences
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C. Upper Bound on the Manager's Share
How do we reconcile the optimal contracting model with the
market forces limitations on appropriation discussed in Part II?
After all, both approaches are very much within the law and
economics framework. Although not generally portrayed in this
fashion, it may be helpful to think of the market forces discussed in
Part II as overriding external limitations and optimal contracting
as a contingent internal limitation on managerial appropriation.
For example, if a company were to invest too little in monitoring, it
might suffer such a large residual loss as to trigger a takeover. On
the other hand, if the directors were to invest in monitoring well
beyond the efficient level, this spending might represent excessive
agency costs that could be eliminated via takeover.
In between, however, there may be a range of solutions-levels
of contracting and monitoring and resulting residual loss-that
hold total agency costs below the external market forces cap. A
shareholder-regarding board of directors would select the solution
that minimizes total agency costs within this subset of options. Of
course, this optimal contract could be viewed as the result of market
forces. If the manager refuses to accept this contract, he can be
replaced, assuming the contract provides at least the reservation
wage. However, external market forces do not dictate this result. If
the board is captured, derelict, or just ill-advised, agency costs could
exceed the minimal level without triggering a takeover or invoking
another external market limitation.
D. Effect of an Additional Channel of Appropriation on the
Optimal Contract
As suggested above, the optimal contract will generally contain
an incentive compensation element and result in the optimal
manager's share exceeding his reservation wage. The manager's
share will be capped by market forces, but the shareholders will
seek to minimize agency costs below this level. Thus far, I have
analyzed a case in which the manager has no access to any avenue
of pecuniary value appropriation except for direct compensation. I
on the firm's stock price that are outside the manager's control).
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will now relax that constraint and investigate the impact of
additional avenues of appropriation under the optimal contracting
framework.
Suppose that Minitially has no opportunity to engage in lucrative
self-dealing with his firm. Perhaps all transactions between
companies and managers are prohibited by mandatory corporate
law and monitoring is costless. Suppose the optimal contract is the
incentive contract described above.
Now suppose that the prohibition on self-dealing is lifted and an
overall fairness test is applied to judge whether a transaction
between a firm and its manager represents a breach of fiduciary
duty.94 Suppose also that SH is incapable of detecting and
preventing all such transactions without incurring exorbitant
monitoring expenses. M now has a new avenue of appropriating
private benefits. Because he enjoys 100% of such benefits and bears
only a fraction of their cost through his incentive compensation
arrangement and small ownership share of the firm, we can expect
him to extract private benefits through self-dealing, increasing his
overall appropriation and the agency costs faced by shareholders.
Assume for now that self-dealing represents a pure value transfer
from SH to M and has no other effect on shareholder value. Imagine
that M extracts private benefits of 20 through self-dealing, which
reduces firm value from 80 to 60. Mbears half of the cost of reduced
firm value, receiving incentive compensation of only 5, but his total
share of firm value increases to 35.95 Agency costs increase to 60,
consisting of M's compensation of 15, direct monitoring of 5, and
residual loss of 40. Thus, SH enjoys only 40 after agency costs.96
Shareholders, however, need not accept this result. If SH could
perfectly and costlessly observe the level of M's self-dealing--or even
estimate it accurately-SH could simply reduce M's compensation
by 10 and restore the status quo. But monitoring is costly and,
although SH suspects self-dealing, the reduction in firm value from
94. Under current law, self-dealing transactions are permitted if they can satisfy a judicial
test of fairness or, in some states, if the transaction is properly approved by independent
directors or shareholders. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 160-61 (1986).
95. M's share of firm value is calculated as follows: 5 (incentive compensation) plus 20
(private benefits) plus 10 (fixed compensation).
96. Again, this calculation ignores M's 1% share.
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80 to 60 could be the result of poor market conditions or bad luck.
Thus, restoration of the status quo is infeasible.
Nonetheless, direct monitoring can be increased and the terms
of the incentive compensation arrangement can be revised to
minimize agency costs in this new contracting environment. First,
the shareholders can increase direct monitoring, which discourages
M from engaging in particularly egregious self-dealing behavior.
Second, although it may seem paradoxical at first, the shareholders
may be better off increasing M's compensation in order to better
align incentives. Suppose SH adopts both approaches, increasing
direct monitoring from 5 to 8 and increasing M's share of firm value
in excess of 50 from 50% to 60%. Suppose as a result M reduces
diversion through self-dealing to 5, resulting in firm value of 75. M's
incentive compensation in this scenario is 15 (60% of 25), his salary
remains 10, monitoring is 8, and residual loss is 25, for total agency
costs of 58. Shareholders are better off by 2 with this revised
contract, and M is worse off by 5.
Two aspects of the new optimal contract warrant further remark.
First, optimality is viewed from the shareholders' perspective. In a
sense the new optimal contract is less efficient than the former one:
More is spent on direct monitoring, which reduces the combined
surplus of M and SH. But the idea of the optimal contract is to
minimize shareholder agency costs.9 7 If we wanted to maximize
combined shareholder and manager surplus, we would eliminate
direct monitoring and allow Mto appropriate the entire pie. Second,
one may ask why M would give up private benefits of self-dealing,
of which he enjoys 100% under my assumptions, for 60% of incre-
mental firm value. Of course, he would not if that were the only
lever, but if direct monitoring is increased in conjunction with
adoption of higher-powered incentives, the combination could have
that result.98 The primary point is that both increased direct
97. See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 89. But see Eric Talley, Turning Servile
Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE
L.J. 277, 319 (1998) (noting two common approaches to optimality in the corporate governance
literature, one of which focuses on shareholder wealth maximization and the other on joint
wealth maximization). For the reason discussed in the text, I believe the former approach is
more appropriate in this context. Note, however, that maximizing shareholder value actually
benefits the manager in this scenario because the price at which the manager can sell the
equity of the firm depends on the ability of the shareholders to minimize agency costs.
98. To see this, suppose the increase in direct monitoring increases the likelihood that M
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monitoring and higher-powered incentives have the effect of
raising M's cost of appropriating private benefits. The shareholders
could use either lever, or both, to minimize agency costs in a given
contracting environment.
Comparison of the hypothetical optimal contracts reached in
environments with and without self-dealing reveals two sources
of added managerial value appropriation. First, it is possible that
shareholders may wish to increase incentive compensation in order
to discourage managers from extracting private benefits. Second,
given the assumption of diminishing returns from monitoring, it is
unlikely that it will be optimal for shareholders to completely
eliminate an avenue of appropriation of private benefits. More
likely, as in the example above, some extraction of private benefits
will continue under the optimal contract. 99
In the example discussed above, I have assumed that the "new"
avenue of managerial appropriation represents a simple value
transfer from shareholders to the manager and has no efficiency
effects, but this will not necessarily be the case. Transfers can have
positive or negative efficiency effects.' 0 A corporate opportunity,
for example, might be more valuable in the hands of the manager
than in corporate solution. 1' This type of positive efficiency effect
offsets part of the agency costs resulting from the additional
avenue of slack. Similarly, access to an avenue of appropriation may
in itself create incentives to increase firm value."0 2 On the other
hand, appropriation channels can create dis-benefits. A corporate
opportunity may be valuable to a manager, but more valuable to the
is caught in an unfair self-dealing transaction and is fired. M must weigh the benefit of self-
dealing, the risk of apprehension, and the cost of self-dealing in terms of reduced incentive
compensation.
99. For any given level of contracting and monitoring, residual loss and total agency costs
in the environment permitting additional extraction of private benefits exceed those
experienced in the environment with limited opportunities. Although minimized within the
contracting environment, optimized agency costs are greater in the second environment than
in the first.
100. See Bebchuk & Jolls, supra note 93, at 496-501.
101. See id.
102. See id. For example, it has been argued that insider trading may facilitate the flow of
accurate and timely information about firm value to the markets and may serve as an efficient
compensation device for entrepreneurial activity within a company. See, e.g., HENRY G.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 25,
at 866-72.
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corporation. Even if a self-dealing transaction represents a pure
value transfer, time spent by the manager in finding and negotiat-
ing the transaction could be better spent in improving the business.
As before, I will generally assume in this analysis that avenues of
appropriation represent pure value transfers, but it is important to
bear in mind that this may not always be the case.
E. Factors Affecting the Magnitude of Managerial Appropriation
Under the Optimal Contracting Model
I have argued that additional avenues of value appropriation
increase the manager's share of firm value under the optimal
contracting model because of shifts in the optimal contract in favor
of additional incentive compensation and increased residual slack.
This section analyzes factors that affect the magnitude of these
effects. Intuition suggests that the important factors include the
relative difficulty of direct monitoring, the intensity of private
benefits, and the ability of the directors to unilaterally eliminate a
potential channel of appropriation.
1. Difficulty of Direct Monitoring
If an avenue of managerial appropriation can be directly
monitored, perfectly and costlessly, it should not result in any
incremental appropriation. To begin with a trivial, but hopefully
instructive, example, imagine that a bank manager is given access
to the vault to assist clients but that his contract expressly
prohibits removal of funds for any other purpose. Assuming the
vault is equipped with effective surveillance equipment and that
the guards are instructed to stop anyone except clients from
leaving the building with cash from the vault, this potential avenue
of appropriation should not increase the manager's share. He cannot
get away with embezzling funds and will not try. Even if the bank
manager were to get past the guards, his employer could simply
reduce his other compensation by the amount of the embezzled
funds, again eliminating the impact of this avenue of appropriation
on the manager's share.'
103. Depending on the composition of the bank manager's pay package, this reduction in
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More generally, the more transparent the transaction, the easier
the direct monitoring, and the less the incremental appropriation.
Thus, cash transactions with the company and bonuses based on
discrete events should prove less problematic for shareholders
under the optimal contracting model than complex, long-term
arrangements and noncash transfers. Take the example of cash deal
bonuses that are commonly paid to CEOs for completing mergers or
acquisitions.1" These transactions should be relatively transparent
and easy to monitor directly. It will be clear whether Acme has
acquired Beta according to plan (although it may not be clear
whether the price paid was advantageous). The payment amount is
in cash and is costless to value.
At the other end of the spectrum consider self-dealing. Suppose
Acme purchases widgets from Beta, in which Acme's CEO has an
interest. The transfer of value to Acme's CEO may be difficult to
monitor for several reasons. First, Acme's CEO's interest may or
may not be disclosed; perhaps it is indirect. Beta may be owned by
a friend or relative. Second, even if Beta is wholly owned by Acme's
CEO and the relationship is disclosed, the extent of the transfer is
unclear unless the market for widgets is very transparent itself.
If not, it may be difficult to determine whether the self-dealing
transaction represents a fair exchange or entails a transfer of value
to Acme's CEO.1"5 Insider trading presents similar difficulties.
Because managers can trade anonymously, insider trading is
difficult to detect if managers fail to report their transactions, and
even if all trades are disclosed, it may not be obvious whether a
manager has exploited inside information to generate excess
profits.106
other compensation may or may not affect the bank manager's incentives and shareholder
wealth. See Bebchuk & Jolls, supra note 93, at 489-90.
104. See infra Part V for further discussion and empirical evidence related to deal bonuses.
105. Theoretically, of course, the transfer of value could run in either direction. Managerial
value appropriation occurs when the CEO of Acme, who bears less than 100% of residual
gains and losses, transfers value to his wholly owned company Beta through a self-dealing
transaction. Managerial self-interest virtually ensures that value will not be transferred in
the other direction.
106. At bottom, this is an information asymmetry problem. When transactions are not
transparent and the manager has superior information regarding the participants and profit
potential of trade, agency costs will increase and permit greater managerial appropriation.
Cf. Talley, supra note 97, at 310-36 (analyzing the corporate opportunity doctrine under the
assumption that the manager has private and unverifiable information regarding the degree
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Transactions that provide psychic or other noncash benefits
present particular monitoring challenges. Consider corporate
charitable giving. Suppose Acme makes a large contribution to the
alma mater of its CEO or the hospital that recently hosted his
quadruple bypass operation. Clearly, there is a transfer of value to
the CEO, but how much value? The foregoing examples-self-
dealing, insider trading, and contributions to pet charities-
demonstrate in different ways the two general categories of
monitoring difficulty-spotting the transfer and valuing it.
2. Intensity of Private Benefits
Under the optimal contracting model, it should be relatively easy
to deter value appropriation through channels that offer only weak
private benefits and difficult to deter appropriation when private
benefits are intense. Consider supplemental executive retirement
programs (SERPs). SERPs are designed to supplement pensions for
executives whose participation in qualified retirement plans is
capped under federal law. °7 SERPs are essentially direct transfers
from companies to executives. A dollar spent on a CEO's SERP is a
dollar in his pocket. Of course, if a dollar spent on a CEO's SERP
means that two dollars are spent on the SERPs of his lieutenants,
the intensity of the private benefit is diminished, but take the
extreme case in which only the CEO is offered a SERP. Because the
intensity of private benefits is 100%, it will be impossible to deter
the CEO from increasing the value of his SERP through incentive
compensation alone. 108 No incentive compensation program will
give an executive 100% of incremental value, and most provide
to which an opportunity fits the corporate scheme and that the manager has the incentive to
misrepresent the fit).
107. Although the general idea of a SERP is to provide retirement benefits to highly
compensated executives in excess of the limitations on qualified plans provided in the Internal
Revenue Code, the contours of supplemental plans vary widely from firm to firm. SERPs may
include defined benefit or defined contribution plans or some combination of both. Many plans
simply mirror the provisions of qualified plans, such as traditional defined benefit pension
plans, although they lack the tax advantages associated with qualified plans. See Janet
DenUyl & Matt Leckrone, Perspective: Executive Benefits a Governance Issue (July 2, 2004),
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20041010035901/http://www.mercerhr.com
knowledgecenter/reportsummary.jhtmlldynamicidContent/1 145295.
108. See Bebchuk, supra note 63, at 1461-67 (discussing the difficulty of controlling
managers with respect to highly redistributive issues).
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executives with only a tiny fraction of incremental value. Thus,
shareholders would have to rely on direct monitoring to control
appropriation that provides such intense private benefits.
Compare the deal bonus situation described above. Suppose a
deal bonus is offered to the CEO alone, so that there is no dilution
of private benefits among the troops. Does this imply that deal
bonuses provide high intensity private benefits? Probably, but
not necessarily. Suppose a CEO receives a $1 million bonus for
completing a $100 million acquisition. If the acquisition itself has no
effect on firm value, the deal bonus is analogous to the CEO-only
SERP payment-a dollar for dollar transfer from company to
executive. But what if the CEO overpaid for the target company in
order to secure his bonus? Suppose the value of the CEO's firm falls
by $30 million as a result of the acquisition. A high-powered
incentive compensation scheme could cause the CEO to think twice
about pursuing such acquisitions.
Now consider corporate charitable giving. Let us assume conser-
vatively that corporations receive no return on charitable giving,
which reduces firm value dollar for dollar. A CEO may cause his
firm to make contributions to a pet charity, but unless his psychic
benefits from doing so constitute a significant portion of the dollar
value of the contribution, a highly powered incentive compensation
scheme could deter such behavior.
More generally, one must consider the intensity of the private
benefits enjoyed by the manager in relation to the total cost to the
company of producing those private benefits. The intensity of
private benefits is reduced to the extent that (1) a manager must
share benefits with others, (2) the transfer is not dollar for dollar,
or (3) the transfer causes inefficiencies. 19
To take a final example, consider self-dealing. A manager may be
able to shift value from Acme to Beta through self-dealing. If Acme
simply overpays for widgets, the transfer will be dollar for dollar
from Acme to Beta, and the intensity of the private benefits will
109. Here I refer to inefficiencies that directly reduce firm value. It may also be the case
that managers incur varying levels of private costs in appropriating value through various
channels. Obviously, a manager would consider these costs as well and would tend to
gravitate towards low private cost avenues of appropriation. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Extension of
Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985) (making a similar argument
with respect to firms with monopoly power gravitating toward low cost restrictive practices).
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depend on the Acme manager's relationship with Beta. (High if he
is a sole proprietor; low if he is one of many shareholders.) However,
if Acme buys widgets from Beta instead of the more appropriate
gizmos from Gamco or reduces production because of the high cost
of Beta's widgets, there may be efficiency losses as well as value
transfer, which should reduce the intensity of private benefits.
3. Ability of Directors to "Just Say No"
The optimal contracting model assumes that the principal can
easily observe results, but not actions.110 As a result, if the directors
have unilateral control over a potential channel of appropriation, an
optimal contract would not include that channel unless its inclusion
enhanced shareholder value. In other words, if the directors can just
say no to a channel, providing that channel cannot increase
managerial appropriation at shareholder expense under the optimal
contracting model.
Suppose a certain perk or benefit (perhaps executive financial
planning services) represents a pure value transfer from share-
holders to the manager and has no other effect on firm value. Under
the optimal contracting model, this perk will not be provided unless
the manager pays for it through a reduction in other compensation.
If there are tax or other advantages to the firm purchasing the perk
or benefit in lieu of the executive, the savings may be shared by the
parties; but, again, unless the firm is at least made whole (after tax)
for the provision of such benefits, they will not be provided under
the optimal contracting model."' As I suggested in Part I, if the
perk or benefit provides a degree of risk-free compensation to the
manager, the shareholders should share in the combined surplus to
110. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 312-25.
111. Some companies do expressly bar certain avenues of value appropriation. For example,
a recent Intel proxy statement notes that its executives do not have access to many of the
perks that are common in U.S. public companies. It states: "We do not provide officers with
reserved parking spaces or separate dining or other facilities, nor do we have programs for
providing personal benefit perquisites to officers, such as permanent lodging or defraying the
cost of personal entertainment or family travel." The New Compensation Committee
Responsibilities: A Roadmap for Meeting the New Standards and Avoiding Personal Liability,
CORP. CouNs., May-June 2004, at 1, 8 [hereinafter Compensation Committee Responsibilities]
(quoting INTEL CORP., PROXY STATEMENT 21 (2003)). Note that this statement does not rule
out all perks, such as access to company planes and cars.
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at least this extent. 112 The directors, who have unilateral control
over the provision of the perk or benefit under the optimal
contracting framework, can make a "take it or leave it" offer to the
executive, who will accept if he is guaranteed no reduction in total
compensation and in addition enjoys the upside opportunity. Thus,
under the optimal contracting model, potential channels of manage-
rial appropriation that are under the unilateral control of the
directors cannot result in incremental appropriation as defined in
Part I.113
These observations extend beyond perks and benefits. Consider
again CEO deal bonuses. The payoff from acquisitions is, of course,
much more uncertain than the economics of perks and benefits, but
unless the expected value of paying a deal bonus is positive for
the firm, directors should just say no, and these bonuses should
not increase managerial appropriation under this model. In the
real world, directors make mistakes and executives may mislead
them into pursuing an acquisition (and paying a deal bonus) that
ultimately diminishes shareholder value. But if we assume, as the
optimal contracting model does, that directors are loyal agents of
shareholders who negotiate at arm's length, such mistakes should
be the exception, not the norm.
On the other hand, incremental managerial appropriation is
possible when the directors cannot just say no, and the most
problematic channels of appropriation under this model are
activities such as self-dealing, taking corporate opportunities, and
insider trading, which are largely within the control of the manager.
Even if the directors contractually restrict or prohibit these
activities, they cannot compel compliance. Appropriation through
these channels can be hidden. Assuming that these channels can be
more effectively blocked through legal restrictions than contractual
arrangements, deregulation of these activities should increase total
managerial appropriation under the optimal contracting model." 4
112. See supra Part I.B.
113. In the "fixed pie" scenario, incremental managerial appropriation was defined to
include any incremental compensation received by the manager as a result of the addition of
a new channel of appropriation, which necessarily comes at shareholder expense. In the "pie
enlarging" scenario, incremental appropriation was defined narrowly to reach the failure to
downwardly adjust a manager's other compensation for the risk-free element of a new channel
of appropriation. See supra Part I.B.
114. Lucian Bebchuk and Christine Jolls provide another explanation of why appropriation
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Consider insider trading. Trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information is prohibited by mandatory legal rules,
1 1 5
and penalties for illegal insider trading can include large fines and
even imprisonment. 1 ' The legal prohibition and extracontractual
enforcement mechanisms should reduce the amount of insider
trading that takes place, the expense of direct monitoring, and the
extent to which companies are required to offer incentive compen-
sation to mitigate the private benefits available through insider
trading.
Imagine that the federal rules prohibiting insider trading were
simply repealed, and suppose insider trading generally is not an
efficient form of managerial compensation. Companies might
decide to prohibit the practice contractually. It is unlikely, however,
that companies could impose contractual penalties that would
provide the level of deterrence created under current federal law.
Companies also would lack the detection and enforcement tools
available to the federal government." 7 As a result, all else being
through such channels leads to greater overall appropriation. Bebchuk & Jolls, supra note 93.
They begin with the assumption that conventional compensation is optimized to ensure
maximum shareholder value given wealth limitations. Id. at 491-92. Diversion of share value
to the managers via these alternative channels generally will not provide the same value-
maximizing incentives. Thus, even if shareholders could limit total managerial appropriation,
share value would decline because of reduced incentives. In order to restore share value-
maximizing incentives in the face of inefficient value diversion, shareholders would likely
sanction an overall increase in managerial appropriation. This assumes, of course, that the
alternative appropriation channel does not provide some sort of offsetting efficiency benefit
for the manager. The authors' model reflects this possibility as well. Id. at 496-501. Bebchuk
and Jolls' analysis is correct, but under a strict optimal contracting framework, their
conclusion would hold only if the directors could not unilaterally prohibit the alternative
appropriation channel.
115. Unlike many state corporate law rules that are merely default provisions, see, e.g.,
Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 141, 212, 214, companies cannot "opt out" of the federal insider
trading rules, principally Securities Exchange Act section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000), and Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
116. Through the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264,
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, Congress
has dramatically increased civil and criminal penalties for insider trading over the past
twenty years. Current potential penalties for the worst offenders include treble damages in
civil prosecutions and fines of up to $5 million and imprisonment for up to twenty years in
criminal prosecutions. See Securities Exchange Act §§ 21A(a)(2) (civil penalties), 32(a)
(criminal penalties) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-l(a)(2), 78ff(a) (2000)).
117. Conceivably, a market for monitoring insider trading could develop in the absence of
a legal prohibition, and privatized monitoring could be more efficient than governmental
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equal, managerial appropriation of private benefits via insider
trading would rise. As before, the optimal contracting framework
suggests that companies would reoptimize in this new environment
by increasing direct monitoring, increasing incentive compensation,
or through a combination of these and other measures. Nonetheless,
residual slack and value appropriation would increase under this
model if the federal restrictions were lifted.
Other companies might decide that insider trading can offer
benefits to the firm in certain situations and might attempt to
regulate the practice contractually rather than prohibit it. A
company that wished to regulate insider trading without prohibiting
it would need to promulgate rules defining who may trade on inside
information, how, and when; develop procedures for auditing trades
of employees for compliance with such procedures; and specify
penalties for noncompliance. This process would be more difficult
and costly to monitor than simple prohibition.11 Under the optimal
contracting model, however, we assume that the directors would
choose the level of private regulation that maximizes shareholder
value, so increases in monitoring cost and residual slack would be
accepted only if these were offset by efficiency gains. In other words,
a decision to permit but regulate insider trading could not result in
share value-decreasing appropriation under this model.
If, instead of wholesale deregulation of insider trading, Congress
were to permit companies to opt out of or into the federal regulatory
system, this shift would have little effect on incremental appropria-
tion under the optimal contracting model. Presumably, companies
would opt out of a more effective public regulatory environment only
if the benefits exceeded the costs.'19 Even optional deregulation
could have some adverse impact, however, if reduced participation
in the federal system undermined its effectiveness.
monitoring. Even if that were the case, however, private monitors would lack important
monitoring tools, such as subpoena power, that are available to the government and certainly
would lack the ability to impose criminal penalties on violators.
118. See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 91, at 38 (assuming that it is easier for the
principal to exclude an activity than to restrict and monitor that activity).
119. There is an extensive literature grounded in the optimal contracting model that
argues for the replacement of mandatory corporate law with a system permitting firms to opt
into or out of corporate law rules. For an overview of that literature and criticism thereof see
Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
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Except for insider trading, the avenues of value appropriation
discussed in this Article are permitted by law, and there are no
opportunities to opt into legal prohibitions. Companies may prohibit
or regulate these practices as they see fit. Formerly, self-dealing was
prohibited by mandatory corporate law. 12' But the law has evolved
in favor of a more lenient fairness test. This analysis suggests that
such a move may have been costly for shareholders, but, of course,
the benefits may have outweighed the costs."' Generally, however,
self-dealing, taking corporate opportunities, and insider trading
pose the most significant threats of increasing agency costs and
managerial appropriation under the optimal contracting model
because the directors cannot just say no.'
22
IV. EFFECT OF ADDITIONAL AVENUES OF APPROPRIATION
UNDER THE MANAGERIAL POWER MODEL
The previous Part analyzed stylized contractual arrangements
between a manager and a homogeneous group of shareholders.
There are at least two problems with this model. First, shareholders
and their goals are not homogeneous.' 21 Second, shareholders do
not negotiate directly with management; they act through the
company's board of directors. As a result, the agency problems in
the modern publicly traded corporation are actually much more
daunting than those described in the optimal contracting model.
The managerial power model of corporate governance attempts to
reflect the reality of this situation-the limited power of sharehold-
120. See CLARK, supra note 94, at 160.
121. It is conceivable that the cost associated with the over-inclusiveness of a blanket
prohibition against managerial self-dealing exceeded the agency costs associated with
deregulation. The foregoing analysis suggests, however, that an opt-in or opt-out approach
might have been superior.
122. One may be tempted to think that executive compensation falls into this category as
well. After all, managers must be paid. Does this mean that compensation arrangements are
fertile sources of incremental managerial appropriation? No, not under the optimal
contracting model. Managers can be paid in cash. Under this model, firms would elect to pay
managers by other means only if doing so increased shareholder value. As in the case of deal
bonuses, compensation delivered via stock options, restricted stock, or other arrangements
cannot increase managerial appropriation to the shareholders' detriment under this model.
123. I am not very concerned about the shareholder heterogeneity issue. In large public
companies, shareholders generally want to maximize share value and can select their
portfolios to achieve the desired level of risk. See Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 87-88.
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ers, the incentives and behavioral forces faced by the board, and the
power of management resulting from informational and positional
advantages-and describe the effect on managerial appropriation. 1
24
This Part will apply the managerial power model to the specific
questions of whether and how additional avenues of value appropri-
ation contribute to the manager's overall share of firm value.
A. Description of the Managerial Power Model
The managerial power model suggests that we should not expect
public companies to reach optimal contracts with managers.'25 The
reasoning, in brief, is as follows: Boards are imperfect agents of
shareholders. Although well paid, directors generally have relatively
weak financial incentives to maximize firm value. 126 The incentive
to retain a board position generally outweighs the incentive to
maximize shareholder value.'27 As a result, outside directors are
encouraged to acquiesce to the executives who have the power to
retain or fire them. 128 In addition, a number of psychological forces
at play in the boardroom tend to foster an attitude of deference to
the CEO.
129
What does this model have to say about executive compensation
and managerial value appropriation generally? First, as with the
124. See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 5 (setting out the managerial power approach
to executive compensation).
125. However, the managerial power model should be seen as complementing the optimal
contracting model, not as a mutually exclusive view of corporate governance. Proponents of
the managerial power view do not deny that agency costs and incentives play some role in
setting managerial compensation. See id. at 755. Perhaps the managerial power view should
be termed the (sub)optimal contracting view.
126. Id. at 769-70.
127. Id. at 770-71.
128. Obviously, corporate executives cannot hire and fire outside directors in the
traditional sense of the terms, but they have considerable power over the director nomination
process, which in most cases is tantamount to a director appointment process. See id. at 766-
67.
129. Traditionally, outside directors have been expected to support their CEO unless and
until circumstances arise in which it becomes necessary to replace him. See Brian G.M. Main
et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive Compensation: Economic and
Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 293, 304 (1995). The social dynamics
within the boardroom are marked by norms of reciprocity and deference to authority. Outside
directors, for example, tend to reciprocate for their appointments by deferring to and
supporting the CEO. Id.
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optimal contracting model, this model recognizes that market
forces place an upper bound on value appropriation.13 ° Despite
imperfect contracting, however, this model does not suggest that
management necessarily will be able to appropriate firm value up
to the market forces bound. The model posits that directors are
subject to an outrage constraint. Although directors have a strong
incentive to please management, they also have a public reputation
to maintain. Most outside directors of large public companies are
CEOs in their own right or other noted professionals. As such, they
will tend to resist compensation policies or practices that bring
disrepute. Of course, all of this is relative. Compensation practices
of major companies are judged by the practices of their peers.13'
As a result, the managerial power model suggests the critical
importance of transparency and salience of compensation or other
value appropriation. If all channels of appropriation were perfectly
transparent and equally salient, channels would be irrelevant under
this model. Outrage would be a function only of total appropriation.
But appropriation is not transparent, and managers may be able to
increase their share by camouflaging compensation and avoiding
outrage.132 They will tend to follow the herd and avoid significant
deviations from industry pay practices, but they will take advantage
of low-salience means of extracting additional value.
B. Avenues of Value Appropriation Under the Managerial
Power Model
The number and types of channels of value appropriation
available clearly affect the manager's overall share of firm value
under the managerial power model. Cash salary, the compensation
paradigm, is the most transparent and salient form of compensation
available. Thus, dividing compensation between salary, bonuses,
perks, golden parachutes, and the like tends to reduce salience and
130. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 787.
131. See id. at 789-91. In addition, corporate directors are increasingly subject to standards
of corporate governance imposed by Congress under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, and by the stock exchanges, including standards of independence
and diligence. Directors serving on audit and compensation committees are affected
particularly. These directives ultimately may complement and even reinforce the outrage
constraint.
132. Id. at 789.
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outrage and permit greater overall appropriation. This can be
thought of as a "divide and prosper" strategy. In addition, certain
channels of value appropriation provide greater camouflage than
others. In some cases it may be difficult to detect the value transfer
or the extent of the transfer. In others, the transfer may be trans-
parent, but a plausible justification exists for adding this transfer
to the manager's existing share. The more opaque and/or plausibly
justifiable the transfer, the less the outrage, and the greater the
value appropriation via that channel.
1. Opaque Value Transfer
In the previous Part, I argued that monitoring difficulty-
challenges in identifying or valuing transfers to managers-is a key
factor in determining the extent to which an added avenue of
appropriation will increase a manager's share of firm value under
the optimal contracting model. Opacity is a similar concept within
the managerial power framework, and generally lack of transpar-
ency has similar effects under the two models, but there is an
important difference that follows from the differing mechanisms.
Under the optimal contracting model, the opportunity for incremen-
tal value transfer arises because the principal has difficulty spotting
or valuing the transfer, but we assume that it is in the principal's
interest to find and evaluate these transfers in order to minimize
agency costs. Under the managerial power model, the issue is the
opacity of transfers to financial analysts and institutional investors
who provide the outrage that limits appropriation. 3 Under this
model, both managers and directors have an interest in camouflag-
ing compensation. Of course, the factors that make it difficult to
monitor transfers also tend to make them opaque to corporate
critics, but opacity also can arise from deliberate obfuscation.
Insider trading, self-dealing, and directing corporate contribu-
tions to pet charities can each provide for opaque value transfer to
managers for the reasons discussed in Part III-the transfers can
be difficult to spot (insider trading and, perhaps, self-dealing) and
even if spotted difficult to value, particularly if noncash benefits are
involved (self-dealing and contributions to pet charities). But even
133. See id. at 787.
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when the manager is clearly the sole beneficiary of a cash-only
arrangement, the value transfer may remain opaque. Supplemental
executive retirement programs, which are discussed above,
134
provide an instructive example. SERPs are extraordinarily complex,
and the expected payoffs are far from transparent. A leading
executive compensation expert has written that "[firom proxy
disclosures, even sophisticated compensation consultants have been
unable to figure out exactly how much the [company executives] will
actually receive under a company's SERP.' 35 If value transfer by
way of SERPs is opaque to compensation experts, it seems likely
that these will serve as a low outrage means of increasing the
manager's share. 13' Note that SERPs do not necessarily present a
monitoring problem under the optimal contracting framework. The
fact that SERPs are difficult to value based on the information
contained in required proxy disclosures does not mean that the
principal would have difficulty determining the expected value of
these commitments, although surely this is somewhat more difficult
and costly than evaluating salary payments.
In Part II, I also argued that external market forces limitations
on managerial appropriation are undermined by the introduction of
opaque channels of appropriation. The effect of opacity under these
two models is similar, but not necessarily identical. One might
imagine, for example, that it is harder to hide appropriation from
corporate raiders, who have a strong profit incentive for ferreting
out such information, than from the financial press and other less
interested observers, in which case opacity could have a larger
impact on total managerial appropriation under the managerial
power model than the external market forces limitation model.
134. See supra Part III.E.2.
135. Compensation Committee Responsibilities, supra note 111, at 6; see also DenUyl &
Leckrone, supra note 107 (providing an example in which the lump sum value of a SERP for
a fifty-seven-year-old CEO retiring after twenty years of service and earning $1 million base
salary and $1 million annual incentives immediately before retirement could range from $9.5
million to $68.3 million depending on changes in assumptions concerning adjustments to
reflect commencement of benefits prior to normal retirement age, payment over the joint lives
of the CEO and spouse, credits for years of service prior to joining the company, inclusion of
long-term incentive compensation in pensionable earnings, and discount rates).
136. Transparency is further undermined by the fact that SERP payouts occur after an
executive's retirement and thus are not reported in the annually published tables that are the
most visible marker of executive compensation. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 99-
100.
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2. Plausible Justifications for Additional Transfers
Certain value transfers to managers are perfectly transparent
but nonetheless may produce less outrage than equivalent salary
payments because a plausible justification exists for the specific
incremental transfer. Deal bonuses are a prime example. As noted,
many firms provide executives with one-time bonuses for completing
the acquisition of a target company or for similar specific transac-
tions.137 The skeptic may ask why a CEO receives salary and options
if not to pursue value-added acquisitions, but a plausible story can
be told that a specific deal bonus opportunity is justified in order to
focus an executive's attention on an acquisition. This is similar to
the logic used to justify incentive compensation generally, but
applied to a specific project.
In fact, equity compensation can be viewed in the same light.
Although equity programs also can be complex and certainly are
much less transparent than cash compensation, the primary outrage
deflector is the argument that stock and options provide incentives
that cause managers to grow the pie. Of course, there is more than
a grain of truth to this. Equity compensation does provide incentives
that are valuable to shareholders. The appropriate questions are:
How much stock? How many options? At what price? In what
fashion? Once outrage is deflected through the plausible justifica-
tion of incentive alignment, however, it is easier for executives to
extract value through these programs.
While plausible justification reduces outrage under the manage-
rial power model, it should have no effect under the optimal
contracting model. As discussed in Part III, the optimal contracting
model assumes that the principal cannot be fooled into providing the
manager with additional compensation at the expense of sharehold-
ers.
3. Both Opaque and Plausibly Justified
Of course, many avenues of value appropriation exhibit both
properties-the transfer is opaque and plausibly justified as a
valuable addition to the compensation smorgasbord. SERPs and
137. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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stock options certainly have elements of both. In addition to being
complex, SERPs can be plausibly justified on fairness or efficiency
grounds as follows: Despite the tax code limitations, executives
require pensions proportional to their salary just like rank and file
employees if they are to maintain their standard of living in
retirement. 138 In addition to being plausibly justifiable on incentive
grounds, option values obviously are less transparent than cash.
Despite the widespread adoption of the Black-Scholes option pricing
model to traded options, experts continue to debate the accuracy of
that model in the context of compensatory options.
139
Several other common avenues of value appropriation fall into
this category as well. Management perks generally can be plausibly
justified on efficiency grounds. Executive time is extremely valu-
able, and company cars and planes free up time for busy executives.
Country club memberships and company apartments provide quiet
venues for entertaining company clients. But executives receive
personal enjoyment and psychic benefits from these perks and the
status they signal. Valuing these personal benefits is difficult, and
the challenge for outside analysts is compounded when companies
obscure the cost of these perks. For example, companies are
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
disclose the value of perks provided to certain senior executives if
the aggregate value exceeds $50,000.140 Suppose a company spends
$100,000 per year on a limo and driver for the CEO. One would
think that this perk must be disclosed, but by making the car and
138. SERPs, however, may be a tax-inefficient means of providing executive retirement
benefits if the choice is between an executive investing after-tax dollars at favorable capital
gains rates and the company making the same investments but paying the higher corporate
tax rate. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 97-98. On the other hand, SERPs may be tax
efficient if the employing company has large losses and is effectively tax exempt. Cf. David
I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 737-38 (2004)
(making the same argument with respect to equity compensation).
139. See, e.g., Zvi Bodie et al., For the Last Time: Stock Options Are an Expense, HARv. Bus.
REV., Mar. 2003, at 63, 65-68; Lingling Wei, What's the Cost of a Stock Option?, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 2004, at C3 (noting that experts view the more complicated "binomial valuation" as
more accurate than the simpler Black-Scholes formula).
140. For executives receiving less than $500,000 combined annual salary and bonus, the
threshold for disclosure is 10% of salary plus bonus. See SEC Reg. S-K, Item
402(b)(2)(iii)(C)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2005).
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driver "available" to other executives, the company can treat only
the CEO's personal use as a perk and thus avoid disclosure.'41
Golden parachute contracts provide another example. A golden
parachute provides an executive of an acquired company a
comfortable financial landing if she is displaced as a result of
the acquisition.'42 The incentive rationale is straightforward.
Management positions are valuable to incumbents. All else being
equal, managers will fight to retain position even if that means
foregoing an opportunity for the company to be acquired at a
premium to share price. Because managers have a great deal of
discretion to combat takeovers under corporate law, golden para-
chutes enhance shareholder value by encouraging managers to step
aside when a potential buyer comes offering a premium.'43 However,
golden parachute contracts are difficult to value. These contracts
typically provide for severance payments, acceleration of option and
retirement program vesting, and various other goodies.'44 Recent
contracts also require the company to "gross up" the executive for
any taxes that are incurred by the executive as a result of the
payments under § 280G, the anti-golden parachute provision of the
Internal Revenue Code.'45 Thus, even if they can be calculated, the
face value of parachute payments typically understates the expected
value transfer to the covered executive in the event of a takeover
and displacement.
C. Other Factors Affecting Managerial Appropriation Under the
Managerial Power Model
In the previous Part of this Article, I argued that under the
optimal contracting model the impact of an avenue of value
appropriation on the manager's share would depend on the difficulty
of direct monitoring, the intensity of private benefits, and the ability
of the directors to just say no. The first two factors also play a role
141. See Compensation Committee Responsibilities, supra note 111, at 7.
142. Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21,
39 (1988).
143. See id. at 39-41.
144. See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX
REV. 125, 131 (2001).
145. See id. at 136, 139.
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under the managerial power model. I have already noted the
similarity between the monitoring difficulty problem and the opacity
issue under the managerial power framework. Intensity of private
benefits probably plays less of a role under the managerial power
model. On first inspection, a manager might not seem to care about
the "efficiency" of an avenue of value appropriation under this
model. Whether the cost to the firm is dollar for dollar of value
transferred or ten dollars per dollar transferred, the manager
should take the opportunity. Efficiency may affect saliency and
outrage, however. If a firm enters into a disastrous string of
acquisitions in order to generate deal bonuses for its CEO, the
underlying transactions as well as the bonuses may generate
outrage. In addition, inefficient transfers may introduce market
discipline-a takeover or bankruptcy, for instance. Thus, managers
should be somewhat concerned with the intensity of private benefits
under the managerial power model, but perhaps to a lesser extent
than the optimal contracting model would predict. Finally, the
extent to which a potential channel of appropriation is under the
control of the board or the managers would not appear to have any
bearing on incremental appropriation under this model.
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As we have seen, added avenues of managerial appropriation
directionally lead to greater total appropriation, whether appropria-
tion is capped by external market forces, an optimal principal/agent
contract, or saliency and outrage in accordance with the managerial
power theory. However, certain potential channels of appropriation
that are easily monitored and under the unilateral control of the
directors should result in little incremental appropriation under
the optimal contracting model, but could result in significant
incremental appropriation under the managerial power or external
market forces models. This Part examines a handful of empirical
studies that allow us to test the theory developed above and the
explanatory power of the various models.146
146. I should stress that this Part is by no means intended as an exhaustive review of the
extensive empirical literature on executive compensation and perks, but rather is designed
to focus on specific evidence that supports or refutes the claims of this Article. For a more
complete review of the empirical literature on executive compensation, see Bebchuk et al.,
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Although this limited body of evidence can in no way be consid-
ered conclusive, it is suggestive. In brief, the evidence suggests that
additional channels of appropriation lead to increased total
managerial compensation and that incremental managerial
compensation cannot be fully explained by enhanced efficiency. In
other words, additional channels of appropriation appear to lead to
increased transfers of wealth from shareholders to managers.
Moreover, the evidence is largely inconsistent with the optimal
contracting model. Channels that should lead to little or no
incremental appropriation under this model, because they are easily
monitored and under the unilateral control of directors, significantly
increase total appropriation. This evidence better supports the
managerial power view (and possibly the external market forces
view).
A. The Empirical Evidence Suggests that Unconventional
Compensation Increases Total Compensation
Recent evidence suggests that stock options, CEO deal bonuses,
executive loans, and certain perks do not substitute for other
forms of compensation but represent incremental managerial
compensation. One recent study does suggest that insider trading
profits may substitute for other compensation, but the weight of this
limited evidence runs counter to the fixed appropriation view.
1. Stock Options
Stock option compensation for CEOs and other senior corporate
executives increased dramatically in the 1990s. Between 1992 and
1998, the median compensation of S&P 500 company CEOs
increased by 160%."'1 This reflected a 335% increase in option
compensation and about a 55% increase in salary and bonus. 48 Put
another way, options increased from 19% of the median CEO's pay
supra note 5.
147. See Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder
Alignment of Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 145 tbl.1 (2000).
148. See id.
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package in 1992 to 32% in 1998,"49 at which point options had
become the single largest component of CEO compensation.15 °
It is highly unlikely that the boom in options substituted for other
forms of CEO pay or that, in the absence of options, median CEO
compensation would have reached the same level in 1998. First,
median salary and bonus pay continued to rise steadily throughout
this period despite the explosion in options and the 1993 enactment
of § 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which limits the deduct-
ibility of executive compensation that is not performance-based.'
Second, the rate of increase in total CEO compensation across the
period is much more dramatic than anything experienced before the
widespread adoption of executive stock options.'52
This intuition is confirmed by two recent studies that fail to find
substitution of option grants for non-option compensation.'53 After
adjusting for company performance and other factors, these studies
find that companies that grant more options to senior managers
tend to provide more non-option compensation as well.'54 The
149. See id.
150. See Murphy, supra note 56, at 2515.
151. See Perry & Zenner, supra note 147, at 145 tbl.1; Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for
Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN.
ECON. 453, 460 (2001).
152. Since its inception in 1934, the SEC has required publicly held companies to disclose
annually the compensation of top executives. A recent study of the compensation of the three
most highly paid executives in a sample of seventy-seven large firms from 1936 to 1969 (hand-
collected data) and from 1992 to 2002 (Compustat Execucomp data) reveals that average total
real compensation was essentially flat at around $1 million year-2000 dollars across the
earlier period and then rose at an average annual rate of almost 11% between 1992 and 2002.
Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Historical Trends in Executive Compensation, 1936-2002,
at 38 fig.7 (Nov. 14, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The authors are
currently working to collect data for the 1970s and 1980s, but any increases over these periods
will be dwarfed by the 1990s pay explosion. Unfortunately, executive compensation data is
not generally available prior to passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Thus, one
cannot prove that CEO pay explosions did not occur during the 1920s or earlier market
booms, but I am skeptical that executive pay increases during these periods approached the
magnitude of the option-driven pay increases of the 1990s.
153. See Matthias Benz et al., Are Stock Options the Managers' Blessing? Stock Option
Compensation and Institutional Controls (Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ.,
Working Paper No. 61, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=251009; Marianne
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals
Do (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7604, 2000), available at http://
ssrn.comabstract=228095. But see Murphy, supra note 71, at 724 (relating several anecdotal
episodes of executives accepting reduced salary for stock and options).
154. Benz et al., supra note 153, at 5 (finding a small but statistically significant positive
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authors of one of the studies worry about a potential omitted
variable problem-some factor not observed that would cause a
company to want to increase a manager's overall compensation
through options and other means.'55 Nonetheless, these results
suggest little or no substitution of options for other forms of
compensation.
2. Deal Bonuses
In a recent study, Grinstein and Hribar analyzed bonuses paid to
CEOs for completing mergers or acquisitions.'5 M&A deal bonuses
are fairly common. Thirty-nine percent of acquiring firms in their
sample of 327 large U.S. M&A deals between 1993 and 1999
compensated their CEO for completing the deal.'57 The authors
found that these bonuses represent incremental compensation that
does not substitute for other forms of pay.158
3. Corporate Aircraft
David Yermack recently investigated personal use of corporate
aircraft.'59 Yermack found a very small and statistically insignifi-
cant positive relationship between personal use of planes and a
CEO's other compensation.' This data obviously provides no
support for the view that personal aircraft use substitutes for other
compensation.
relationship between the value of stock options grants and base salary of senior managers of
S&P 500 companies between 1992 and 1997); Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 153, at
33 (finding a positive relationship between the value of options granted and non-option
compensation for CEOs of 792 large companies between 1984 and 1991).
155. See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 153, at 31.
156. Grinstein & Hribar, supra note 21.
157. Id. at 125-26.
158. Id. at 127. As far as I am aware, this is the only published study addressing this issue.
159. David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior
Shareholder Returns, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=529822.
160. Id. (manuscript at 23-24, 48 tbl.IV).
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4. Executive Loans
Loans from a company to its executives can increase a manager's
compensation in two ways. Executive loans generally are made at
below market interest rates, and many of these loans are forgiven.
In a study of seventy firms with loans outstanding to one or more of
their executives listed on Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database
between 1996 and 2000, Kathleen Kahle and Kuldeep Shastri found
that, on average, stock purchase loans were issued at 2.3% below
the prime rate and that 12.6% of the loans were forgiven.16 Clearly,
the average executive loan contains an element of compensation.
Nonetheless, in comparing the compensation of executives who did
and did not receive loans, Kahle & Shastri's "results indicate that
executives who receive loans are not giving up other forms of
compensation in return for receiving these loans." '62
5. Insider Trading
Running counter to the foregoing, however, is evidence concerning
insider trading recently compiled by Darren Roulstone.16 3 Although
trading by insiders on the basis of material, nondisclosed informa-
tion is prohibited by law, it is well established that corporate
executives trading in the securities of their companies generally
outperform the market by several percentage points." Responding
161. Kathleen M. Kahle & Kuldeep Shastri, Executive Loans, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 791, 795, 798-800 (2004).
162. Id. at 802.
163. Darren T. Roulstone, The Relation Between Insider- Trading Restrictions and Executive
Compensation, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 525 (2003).
164. See, e.g., Leslie A. Jeng et al., Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading: A
Performance-Evaluation Perspective, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 453, 455-57 (2003) (finding in a
study of open market trades reported to the SEC between 1975 and 1996 that insider
purchases earned average abnormal returns of 6% per year, but finding no abnormal returns
associated with insider sales); Bin Ke et al., What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and
How They Use It: Evidence from Insider Trades, 35 J. AccT. & ECON. 315, 316-17 (2003)
(noting "[a] robust result of the literature on insider trading is that insiders subject to the
filing requirements of section 16 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 earn
abnormal stock returns on their trades" and providing evidence that insiders trade on
undisclosed accounting information); Seyhun, supra note 27, at 159 (finding a 7% average
abnormal return during the year following insider open market purchases and sales in the
five years following the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984). But see Dan
Givoly & Dan Palmon, Insider Trading and the Exploitation of Inside Information: Some
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to pressure from institutional investors, regulators, and potential
litigation, many companies have acted to curtail informed trading
by limiting insiders to buying and selling within a window of a
month or less following earnings announcements.165 A recent
analysis by Roulstone suggests that firms that restrict trading in
this fashion pay their executives 4% to 13% more than firms that
fail to restrict trading, after controlling for other factors. 166 This
trade-off between insider trading profits and compensation is in line
with Easterbrook and Fischel's fixed slack argument.6 '
B. The Empirical Evidence Suggests At Least Some Incremental
Appropriation
Evidence that stock options, deal bonuses, aircraft perks, and
executive loans represent incremental compensation does not
necessarily imply incremental appropriation as I have defined it.
It is conceivable that these programs result in incentives that lead
to increased shareholder value, and that the division of the gains
between managers and shareholders is fair and efficient. The
evidence, however, does not support this benign explanation.
First, deal bonuses do not appear to result in increased share-
holder value. Thus, incremental compensation resulting from deal
bonuses clearly represents incremental appropriation. Second,
stock options undoubtedly create share value-enhancing incentives.
The absence of any substitution of option compensation for
conventional compensation, however, indicates that at least some
share value-reducing appropriation is occurring unless one believes
that options are exceptionally risky and that executives are
exceptionally risk averse. It is unclear whether the effect of loan and
perk compensation is more similar to deal bonuses or options, but
the conclusion is the same: Evidence that loans and jet perks
represent pure add-on compensation suggests at least some
incremental appropriation.
Empirical Evidence, 58 J. Bus. 69 (1985) (arguing that insider excess returns are due more
to the response of other investors to transactions by insiders than to yet to be disclosed news).
165. See Roulstone, supra note 163, at 532 (citing studies).
166. Id. at 526.
167. See supra Part I.A.
2005] 645
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
1. Deal Bonuses
Let us begin with deal bonuses. If an acquisition increased the
value of their shares, shareholders might be happy to incrementally
compensate CEOs for completing the deal. The evidence suggests
that M&A deals are not value enhancing for acquiring firms on
average, but some acquisitions are more successful than others, and
thus there still might be an efficiency explanation for deal
bonuses. 6 ' However, Grinstein and Hribar found that deal perfor-
mance did not explain the cross-sectional variation in deal
bonuses.'69 Deal bonuses do not appear to be driven by efficiency
enhancement. If deal bonuses do not increase the pie, as this
evidence suggests, then evidence that deal bonuses represent
incremental managerial compensation suggests that they result in
managers taking larger slices of the pie, i.e., in incremental
managerial appropriation.
2. Stock Options
Unlike deal bonuses, stock options are generally thought to
provide incentives that result in increased firm value. 7 ' Thus, it is
difficult to assess the extent to which increased total managerial
compensation resulting from the introduction of options represents
appropriation of shareholder wealth or a fair and efficient division
of incremental gains with shareholders. Nonetheless, evidence that
168. See Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of
Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757 (2005) (finding that during
the 1990s shareholders of U.S. acquiring firms lost an aggregate of $216 billion on the
transactions, although the loss was skewed late in the period and concentrated among a
relatively small number of spectacularly disastrous acquisitions); Antonios Antoniou et al.,
Measuring the Economic Gains of Mergers and Acquisitions: Is It Time for a Change? (Feb.
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=579841 (criticizing
event study methodology, but reporting that such studies have found that mergers and
acquisitions are much more beneficial to target firm than acquiring firm shareholders).
169. See Grinstein & Hribar, supra note 21, at 120; see also Jerry Coakley & Stavroula
Iliopoulou, CEO Compensation for Bidders in UK M&As 28 tbl.3 (Feb. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.uc3m.es/uc3m/dpto/EMP/seminarf/liopoulou.pdf (finding
no positive correlation between market perception of M&A deal performance and acquiring
company CEO pay in a sample of one hundred completed U.K. acquisitions between 1998 and
2001).
170. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 56, at 2510 ("Stock options provide a direct link between
managerial rewards and share-price appreciation .... ").
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option compensation represents purely incremental compensation
suggests that at least some incremental appropriation results.
One would expect total compensation to increase with increased
reliance on options because an executive pay package that relies
strongly on options in lieu of salary must provide the executive with
greater expected value to make up for the higher risk associated
with the options.171 However, if option compensation were driven
solely by efficiency considerations, one would expect to observe
some substitution of options for non-option compensation, because
stock options provide a degree of low risk compensation. 172 Thus,
empirical evidence suggesting zero substitution of options for other
forms of compensation indicates that options result in at least some
incremental appropriation.
To see this, imagine that an executive is initially paid cash salary
of 100. Now imagine that in order to provide share value-enhancing
incentives, the directors offer the executive an "option" with three
possible payoffs: 20, if the outcome is "low"; 50, if the outcome is
"average"; or 100, if the outcome is "high." The executive is certain
that the outcome will be high, average, or low. In this case, even an
extremely risk-averse executive should be willing to give up 20 of
cash salary in exchange for the option, and shareholder-regarding
directors should insist that the manager accept a salary reduction
at least equal to 20. If the option is granted on top of the preexisting
salary of 100, then incremental appropriation is at least 20.
Incremental appropriation may be much larger than 20, but it is at
least 20.
Of course, executive stock options do not guarantee a payout,
and some options expire unexercised. However, conventional
options come about as close to guaranteeing a payout as possible.
Options are typically granted at-the-money with a fixed exercise
price and a ten-year life. 73 Thus, even if the issuer's performance
lags, executives can cash in on general upswings in the market.
Moreover, if an issuer's stock price falls precipitously, its options
171. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 71, at 723.
172. Clearly conventional executive stock options that pay on the basis of overall stock
market improvements, as well as company-specific improvements, provide low risk
compensation, particularly given the conventional practice of reducing option exercise prices
following a market downturn. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 796-98, 821-24.
173. See Murphy, supra note 56, at 2508.
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often are repriced or replaced to restore the incentive. 74 Thus, even
exceptionally risk-averse managers should be expected to sacrifice
some other compensation for the receipt of stock options, and the
lack of substitution reported in the empirical literature is evidence
of incremental appropriation resulting from options.
175
3. Perks
It is unclear whether the corporate jet perk situation is closer to
that of deal bonuses or of options, but the conclusion is the same
either way: David Yermack's data on this perk suggests at least
some incremental appropriation. As noted above, Yermack's data
suggests that corporate jet consumption represents incremental
compensation. 176 In my view, it is very unlikely that personal use of
corporate jets increases shareholder value. If this is true, jet use
would be analogous to the deal bonus situation described above, and
the lack of substitution of jet consumption for other compensation
would represent incremental appropriation from a fixed pie.
There is evidence, however, that some perks may be efficiency
enhancing. In a study of 300 publicly traded U.S. firms over the
years 1986 through 1999, Raghuram Rajan and Julie Wulf found
some support for the view that perks are used to enhance productiv-
ity.177 For example, they found that "time-saving perks" (such as
corporate cars and planes) were more likely to be used in settings in
which the time saved by the perk is greater (e.g., when company
174. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 821-24.
175. The incompatibility of zero substitution and an efficiency explanation for equity
compensation is probably easier to see with restricted stock than with options. Many
companies grant stock to executives that is forfeitable if the employment relationship is
severed before a vesting date. See Murphy, supra note 56, at 2516. Such "restricted stock"
grants increase pay for performance sensitivity and provide incentives that are similar to
those provided by stock options. The value of a restricted stock grant tracks the company's
share price, but unless the company enters bankruptcy, the restricted stock always has
positive value. Thus, one would expect restricted stock grants (or stock option grants for
analogous reasons) to replace other forms of managerial compensation to some extent, and
not act as pure "add-ons," if equity compensation grants were fully explainable as efficiency
enhancers.
176. See supra Part V.A.3.
177. Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?, 31 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 10494, 2004), available at http://ssrn.comabstract
=546291.
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headquarters is more distant from a major airport).'78 Assuming,
however, that corporate jet use provides risk-free consumption value
to executives, we would expect managers to forego at least some
conventional compensation in exchange for the jets, even if the perk
increases the pie. Yermack's data finding no substitution indicates
that jet use increases appropriation even if Rajan and Wulf are
correct.
4. Executive Loans
The stated justifications for executive loans generally fall into two
broad categories. Most loans are made with the stated purpose of
assisting executives with the purchase of stock or the exercise of
options and are justified as a means of increasing managerial
ownership of the firm's stock and thereby better aligning
incentives. 9 The second category consists of loans that are used
to defray the cost of relocation and purchase of an executive's
residence.8 0 Relocation loans are justified as a useful tool in
attracting and retaining executives.
It is conceivable that some executive loans increase shareholder
value, but there are reasons to be skeptical. Of course relocation
loans can help attract executives, but they are no different from
cash in that respect. Unless an executive has poor credit, providing
a loan at a discounted interest rate should be equivalent to not
providing the loan and simply increasing the manager's cash
compensation by the amount of the discount. There is nothing
efficiency enhancing about compensating executives with loans per
se.
The same can be said for loans made to facilitate the purchase of
stock or exercise of options, but here we have additional evidence
that suggests that the stated rational is suspect. Kahle and Shastri
found that on average a stock purchase loan that enabled a manager
to purchase one hundred shares resulted in increased share
ownership of only eight shares.'' In other words, at the same time
178. See id.
179. Eighty-six percent of loans with a stated purpose in Kahle and Shastri's sample fall
into this category. See Kahle & Shastri, supra note 161, at 798-99.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 804-07. Kahle and Shastri did find that for a subset of executives with low
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that managers have been taking advantage of low interest loans to
acquire stock, they have been selling almost an equivalent number
of shares. If loans have little effect on a manager's overall exposure
to stock price, they do little to align incentives.
Because loans apparently do little to increase the pie, Kahle and
Shastri's evidence that these loans generally do not substitute for
other forms of compensation suggests that loans have resulted in
incremental managerial appropriation.
C. The Empirical Evidence Is Generally Inconsistent with the
Optimal Contracting Model (and Consistent with the
Managerial Power Model)
Neither deal bonuses, stock options, loans, nor perks should
result in significant incremental appropriation under the optimal
contracting model. Evidence that they do contribute to an increased
manager's share is more consistent with the managerial power or
even an external market forces view of corporate governance.
1. Deal Bonuses
Grinstein and Hribar's deal bonus evidence is most clearly in
conflict with the optimal contracting model. If mergers and
acquisitions increased the value of acquiring firms, we would expect
CEOs to be incrementally compensated for completing these deals
under this model.'82 Recall, however, that the evidence suggests
that deal bonuses are not efficiency enhancing.'83 They do not
appear to lead to increased share value, but they do result in
incremental compensation for CEOs, which means that deal
ownership of stock prior to the grant of new stock or options, loans made to facilitate purchase
or option exercise had a substantial impact on share ownership. See id. Thus, I do not rule out
the possibility that executive loans could be pie enhancing in some cases.
182. Even if this were the case, however, deal bonuses would be somewhat problematic
under the optimal contracting theory. Holmstrom and Milgrom showed that high-powered
incentives directed at managerial activity A can be counterproductive if managerial activities
B, C, and D are difficult to monitor. See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 91, at 50. Thus,
in order for deal bonuses to be value enhancing under the optimal contracting model, we
would have to assume that a manager's share-based incentives were sufficient to prevent
excessive focus on deals and the neglect of other important tasks.
183. See supra Part V.B.1.
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bonuses result in an incremental transfer of a slice of a fixed pie
from shareholders to managers."
The optimal contracting theory suggests that managerial
appropriation through deal bonuses should be modest or nonexis-
tent. Deal bonuses are transparent, relatively easy to monitor, and
easily avoidable. If, as the evidence suggests, deal bonuses simply
represent an incremental transfer of shareholder wealth to manag-
ers, directors acting in accordance with the optimal contracting
model simply would not sanction them.
The deal bonus evidence is much more consistent with the
managerial power model. Deal bonuses are plausibly justified as
specific incentive compensation: If the CEO completes the deal, she
gets a bonus. Shareholders are told that the deal will be value
enhancing (although market reaction and retrospective analysis
tells us that few are). Thus, deal bonuses are a means of increasing
CEO compensation without increasing outrage, and the fact that
these bonuses produce incremental compensation bolsters the
persuasiveness of the managerial power model."' 5 This conclusion
is reinforced by another Grinstein and Hribar finding that cross-
sectional variation in M&A deal bonuses correlates with measures
of CEO power." 6
2. Stock Options
Because stock options arguably are pie expanding, it is more
difficult to isolate incremental managerial appropriation and test
the applicability of the corporate governance models. However,
evidence that option compensation does not substitute for other
compensation but is granted as a pure add-on suggests some
incremental appropriation.'87 This incremental appropriation is
inconsistent with the optimal contracting model.
The fact that options exist is not inconsistent with the optimal
contracting model unless options can be shown to reduce share-
holder value, and this has not been shown. Options may result in
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. See also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 127-30 (discussing managerial power
explanation for deal bonuses).
186. See Grinstein & Hribar, supra note 21, at 121, 136-39.
187. See supra Part V.A.1.
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both increased shareholder value and incremental managerial
appropriation, however, if they increase the pie. In this case,
shareholders would not be expected to just say no to stock option
compensation.
Under the optimal contracting model, options, and incentive
compensation generally, are seen as part of the solution to the
managerial agency cost problem.' 8 Issuance of options should
reduce managers' tendency to shirk and extract private benefits,
and shareholders benefit by using incentive compensation to
increase corporate wealth, even if part of the incremental value is
transferred to the managers. Under this model, the arrangement
reached is always optimal, by definition, but it is optimal within the
specific contracting environment. As a result, additional avenues
of appropriation that change the contracting environment can
result in additional managerial value appropriation under the
optimal contracting model. Thus, the fact that option compensation
has supplemented (rather than substituted for) non-equity compen-
sation does not run counter to the optimal contracting theory.
Two factors, however, undermine the optimal contracting
explanation of stock options grants. First, the lack of any substitu-
tion of options for non-option compensation is inconsistent with this
model. As noted, conventional options provide a degree of low risk
compensation. Under the optimal contracting model, one would
expect substitution of options for non-option compensation at least
to that extent.19 One would expect managerial appropriation of this
overlap to be small for the reasons discussed in Part III: Direct
monitoring of option compensation should not be difficult. Option
payoffs are uncertain, but the expected value of options can be
modeled with reasonable certainty. Moreover, option grants are
within the unilateral control of directors.
Second, many option features vary from those expected under the
optimal contracting model, such as a lack of indexation of option
exercise prices to markets and the practice of repricing options
following downturns.'9 ° Other features, such as reload rights,
unnecessarily complicate option assessment and valuation.'9 ' By
188. See, e.g., Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 37, at 93; Murphy, supra note 56, at 2515.
189. See supra Part III.E.3.
190. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 796-817, 821-24.
191. See id. at 831-34. Options with a reload feature result in the issuance of new options
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increasing the difficulty and cost of monitoring, these features may
increase managerial appropriation via options. Under the optimal
contracting model, however, directors should strip options of these
extraneous, complicating features, unless these features increase
the pie, which is doubtful. Thus, the apparently unwarranted degree
of complexity observed in practice further undermines the optimal
contracting explanation for options.
By contrast, observed option practice is consistent with the
managerial power view of corporate governance. Options can be
plausibly justified as incentive compensation, which reduces outrage
and permits executives to increase their total compensation.'92 As
discussed above, the justification for options is much more than just
plausible, it is compelling. Thus, one would expect the option boom
to have led to significantly enhanced managerial appropriation
under this model. The managerial power explanation for stock
option practice is bolstered by findings, in the two empirical studies
described above, that the cost to managers of increased option
grants is greater in well-governed companies'93 and by findings in
another study that significant shareholder opposition to a proposed
stock option plan results in reduced CEO pay in the following
year.'94 This latter finding suggests shareholder outrage is doing
more work than optimal contracting.
3. Perks and Loans
Evidence that executive loans and personal aircraft use do not
reduce traditional compensation also seems more consistent with
the managerial power view than optimal contracting.'95 First, if we
assume that loans and jets do not increase the pie, but instead
to executives who exercise options by surrendering stock. Id. at 832.
192. See id. at 812-15.
193. See Benz et al., supra note 153, at 3 (finding that weak institutional controls are
associated with greater stock option grants); Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 153, at 38
(finding that factors suggesting better corporate governance, such as the presence of large
shareholders or smaller boards, are associated with increased "charges" for options grants).
194. See Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, When Is Enough, Enough? Market
Reaction to Highly Dilutive Stock Option Plans and the Subsequent Impact on CEO
Compensation, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 61, 75-77 (2005) (examining stock option proposals made
during the 1998 proxy season).
195. See Kahle & Shastri, supra note 161, at 802; Yermack, supra note 159 (manuscript at
15, 33 tbl.III).
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transfer a slice from shareholders to managers, directors acting in
accordance with the optimal contracting model should simply
eliminate these programs. Second, even if one believes that
programs of this sort are efficiency enhancing, the lack of any
substitution of loans and perk consumption for other compensation
suggests incremental appropriation that is inconsistent with the
optimal contracting model, because internal monitoring of loan
issuance and perk consumption should not be difficult. The pure
add-on nature of the loan and corporate jet perk is much more
consistent with the managerial power view.
The corporate jet perk case is not completely closed, however.
Yermack did not find perk consumption to be associated with weak
corporate governance,'96 unlike the studies of deal bonuses and
stock option grants discussed above.
4. Insider Trading
As noted, a recent study by Darren Roulstone has found evidence
that insider trading substitutes to some extent for conventional
compensation.197 This evidence is consistent with both a fixed slack
view and optimal contracting. Interestingly, however, Roulstone
also shows that firms that restrict insider trading with trading
windows rely more heavily on incentive compensation than other
firms.'98 This observation runs counter to the optimal contracting
idea that firms will combat private benefit opportunities (such as
those associated with insider trading) with greater incentive
compensation. What are we to make of this finding? Perhaps insider
trading actually does provide managerial incentives along the lines
suggested by Manne' 99 and by Carlton and Fischel, 00 or does so at
the fairly low level of informed trading that is permitted under
196. See Yermack, supra note 159 (manuscript at 24-25).
197. See Roulstone, supra note 163, at 526.
198. Id. at 540-41.
199. See MANNE, supra note 102 (arguing that insider trading can improve the efficiency
of securities markets and of managerial compensation).
200. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 25, at 866-72; see also Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe,
Insider Trading and Managerial Incentives, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 681 (2001) (developing a
model in which, under certain circumstances, permitting insider trading results in an
improved correlation between employee wealth and firm value, thus increasing shareholder
wealth).
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current U.S. law, in which case firms might want to provide other
incentives when they restrict insider trading. Alternatively, perhaps
firms that restrict insider trading to trading windows are better
governed, tend to believe in and rely more heavily on incentive
compensation, and thus, tend to provide more total compensation.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The evidence described in the previous Part suggests that
channels of appropriation affect total managerial appropriation.
Directors may believe that a multifaceted executive compensation
scheme with lots of bells and whistles represents state of the art
compensation design, but there is a largely unrecognized cost to this
complexity-incremental managerial appropriation. This Part will
briefly highlight the implications.
The most obvious implication is that institutional investors
and shareholder advocates must recognize the link between
compensation complexity and managerial appropriation and
require compelling justification for the inclusion of new forms of
compensation. Because opacity is central to appropriation under the
external market forces and managerial power models, a second
implication for those who are skeptical of the optimal contracting
story is that enhanced disclosure may help limit appropriation. A
third implication is that legal rules matter: Deregulation of certain
channels of appropriation that are difficult to monitor and outside
the unilateral control of directors is problematic under any of the
models considered in this Article. Moreover, if one is skeptical of the
optimal contracting model, even limited deregulation permitting
firms to opt out of or into public enforcement schemes is troubling.
A. Channels Matter
If added channels of appropriation increase total managerial
appropriation as the evidence suggests, institutional investors and
shareholder advocates must recognize the link and demand that
complex compensation schemes be justified. This analysis does not
suggest that firms should restrict themselves to paying straight
cash salaries; some incentive compensation clearly is worth the cost
of additional managerial appropriation. But incentive compensation
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can be simple or complex. Option reloads and other complicating
features should not be accepted at face value. Moreover, even if a
new form of compensation creates firm value-enhancing incentives,
one can reasonably ask whether the new compensation element
should replace an existing form of compensation, rather than being
added to an ever more complex array of devices. For example, is
firm value enhanced by granting restricted stock in addition to stock
options?
Of course, if the optimal contracting model adequately described
managerial compensation in publicly traded U.S. companies, share-
holders would not need to worry about a large class of potential
avenues of appropriation that are not efficiency enhancing and are
under the unilateral control of directors. Directors would not provide
these benefits unless executives paid for them. Obviously, one's level
of concern about increasing compensation complexity and increases
in executive benefits, perks, and similar compensation elements
depends on how seriously one takes the managerial power model.
The evidence seems sufficient, however, to suggest that sharehold-
ers and their advocates should demand compelling justification for
the inclusion of new compensation techniques and devices that may
increase managerial appropriation.
B. Disclosure Matters
Because opacity is central to appropriation under the external
market forces and managerial power models, detailed and timely
mandatory disclosure of compensation elements could help limit
appropriation. Managers have an interest in concealing compensa-
tion and will respond to new disclosure requirements by inventing
new, opaque compensation elements. Thus, adequate disclosure
will be a continuing race between regulators, on the one hand, and
corporate executives and their compensation consultants, on the
other. This section will consider just two areas in which enhanced
disclosure is needed: termination payments and corporate contribu-
tions to a manager's pet charity.
Severance payments, whether or not accompanied by a change of
control, represent a surging form of executive compensation. The
opacity of supplemental executive retirement programs and golden
parachute arrangements and the need for enhanced disclosure of
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these items has been discussed above. 21 David Yermack has
recently investigated noncontractual executive severance benefits,
colloquially known as golden handshakes.2 2 His findings are
similar. In a study of golden handshakes provided to Fortune 500
CEOs who left their jobs between 1996 and 2002, Yermack found
that many of the benefits provided were opaque to shareholders.2 3
Particularly opaque were enhancements to pension programs and
adjustments to previously awarded executive compensation, which
together constituted about 54% of the total benefits paid in his
sample.20 4 In addition, about 18% of the benefits took the form of
consulting or non-competition arrangements, both of which are
somewhat opaque and plausibly justifiable to shareholders.2 5 The
SEC should require listed companies to value and clearly disclose
all contractually promised severance benefits at the time such
arrangements are negotiated and annually thereafter, as well as
any noncontractual benefits provided.20 6 The latter, which are
particularly suspect, should be separately disclosed.
Generally, corporate charitable contributions are not covered by
the SEC's mandatory disclosure regime and are not disclosed to
shareholders. 2 7 This lack of disclosure enables executives to direct
contributions to pet charities and receive psychic and perhaps
201. See supra Part IV.B.
202. David Yermack, Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs
(Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=594423.
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 3, 43 tbl.V.
205. See id. Although Yermack recognized that payments to a departing CEO for services
as non-executive board chairman for several years following his departure at times represents
additional disguised severance pay, Yermack excluded these payments from his study because
of the possibility that some of this pay was earned for additional services. See id. at 24.
206. In fact, the SEC should mandate such disclosure of all executive compensation
elements. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 192-94.
207. See Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1191, 1201 (2002) (noting the general rule and explaining that charitable awards that
constitute executive compensation are an exception to the general rule); Faith Stevelman
Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44
UCLA L. REV. 579, 581-82 (1997) (noting that "the federal securities regulations do not
require disclosure of whether a corporation has made any charitable contributions, what the
value of such contributions may have been, or which organizations may have received such
contributions"). But see NYSE LISTED Co. MANUAL § 303A.02 (2004) (requiring a listed
company to disclose in its annual proxy statement or annual report any contribution to a
charitable organization in which a director serves as an executive officer, if such contribution
exceeds the greater of $1 million or 2% of such charitable organization's gross revenues).
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material benefits without triggering shareholder outrage."' Of
course, some corporate contributions will be trumpeted. The whole
idea behind sponsorship of the Metropolitan Opera 0 9 or Masterpiece
Theatre210 is public exposure and approbation. Other contributions
may provide private benefits to managers, however, without broad
public disclosure and the attendant outrage. Large contributions to
the CEO's alma mater or favorite hospital are likely to fall in this
category and prove problematic under the managerial power model.
Mandated public disclosure of significant corporate charitable
contributions and officer or director ties with recipients would help
combat appropriation under the managerial power model. Once
disclosure is made, large contributions will tend to produce outrage
unless these contributions can be plausibly justified. And it should
be more difficult to justify large payments to the CEO's favorite
charities than to justify ostensibly business-related perks. This
analysis strengthens the case for mandatory disclosure of significant
corporate contributions.21
However, enhanced disclosure is a double-edged sword. Increased
disclosure requirements concerning compensation element A may
lead executives to favor a less efficient, but more opaque, compensa-
tion element B. Thus, in order for mandatory disclosure to increase
shareholder value, disclosure practice must stay tightly attuned to
compensation practice, effectively preventing executives from
circumventing the requirements.2"2 In addition, enhanced disclosure
may lead to executive compensation ratcheting upwards as firms
benchmark compensation against each other.21 3 Nonetheless, the
208. James Boatsman and Sanjay Gupta provide empirical evidence that managers "invest"
in corporate charitable giving beyond the profit-maximizing level. See James R. Boatsman &
Sanjay Gupta, Taxes and Corporate Charity: Empirical Evidence from Micro-Level Panel Data,
49 NAT'L TAX J. 193, 206 (1996). This evidence is consistent with the view that managers
derive utility from charitable contributions.
209. Prior to the withdrawal of its sponsorship in 2004, Texaco underwrote radio
broadcasts of the Metropolitan Opera for sixty-three years. Verena Dobnik, Met Opera, Texaco
End Partnership After 63 Years, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETrE, Apr. 29, 2004, at E3.
210. Mobil (and subsequently ExxonMobil) sponsored PBS presentations of Masterpiece
Theatre for thirty years prior to ending its association with the show in 2004. David Bianculli,
No One Bidding on 'Masterpiece,' N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2004, at 79.
211. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 207, at 586 (arguing for mandatory disclosure of corporate
contributions amounts, identities of recipients, and director interlocks).
212. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 194.
213. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 791.
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benefits of enhanced disclosure seem to outweigh the costs, and
disclosure remains the most promising avenue of attack against
runaway compensation and appropriation.
C. Legal Rules Matter
For most of the twentieth century, the dominant theme in the
evolution of corporate law was the movement from mandatory rules
to an enabling framework.214 Shareholders may have benefited from
this movement generally, but managerial appropriation has likely
increased as a result of this movement as well. This section focuses
on three potential channels of managerial appropriation that are
problematic under either the optimal contracting or managerial
power models, and argues that deregulation of these channels has
led or could lead to further increases in managerial appropriation.
Moreover, if one is skeptical of the optimal contracting view, even
limited deregulation allowing companies to opt out of or into
prohibitory legal regimes is problematic.
The taking of corporate opportunities, self-dealing transactions,
and insider trading have similar implications under the models
presented. These transactions present a high risk of significant
value appropriation under either model. The availability of these
avenues of appropriation tends to shift the optimal contract in favor
of the manager and provide a low salience outlet for additional
compensation.
As noted, it is difficult to monitor the appropriation of private
benefits through these channels. Insider trading can be concealed.
Self-dealing can be concealed and, even if disclosed, the profits
from self-dealing transactions can be opaque. Managers may
misrepresent the degree of fit between a potential opportunity and
the corporate plan in order to appropriate such opportunities for
214. This is an often-told story. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1974 (1996) (describing the
evolution from a set of rigid formal rules to an enabling approach). In recent years the tide
has reversed, although recent regulation places much more emphasis on disclosure than
substantive obligations. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
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their own accounts.215 Thus, these avenues of appropriation are
problematic even under the optimal contracting model.
I argued in Part III that mandatory legal prohibitions could
provide extracontractual enforcement mechanisms and sanctions
that could reduce the agency costs associated with these practices
under the optimal contracting model. I also suggested that "opt-out"
deregulation should not be problematic under this model because
directors could simply opt back into the public regulatory system if
doing so increased shareholder value. However, if one is skeptical
of the optimal contracting model after reviewing the evidence
presented in Part V, then this type of opt-out deregulation might be
no better than wholesale deregulation.
In other words, if one subscribes to the managerial power view,
one would not expect directors to pick the regulatory regime that
maximizes shareholder value. Because insider trading, self-dealing,
and the taking of corporate opportunities offer easily camouflaged
compensation, and the private benefits from these activities may
represent a large fraction of the corporate cost, managers could be
expected to persuade directors to allow them to utilize these low
saliency channels to increase their overall appropriation.
Of course, there is also a plausible justification for permitting
these practices or at least permitting case-by-case determinations
instead of reintroducing or maintaining mandatory corporate law
prohibitions. For example, self-dealing could be mutually beneficial
if the manager is also the owner of a key supplier. Allowing the
manager to take a corporate opportunity can be a win-win if the
corporation is less able or unable to exploit the opportunity.216
In my view, however, these justifications are too weak to counter-
act the agency costs resulting from the lack of mandatory corporate
law prohibitions, at least in the case of public companies where
mutually beneficial appropriation of corporate opportunities or other
self-dealing should be rare.217 In any event, policymakers should
recognize the potential for appropriation offered by these channels
215. See Talley, supra note 97, at 282.
216. However, these justifications are much more persuasive in the close corporation
context. See Brudney & Clark, supra note 3, at 1001-06.
217. See id. at 1022-24, 1028-32 (presenting a cost-benefit analysis supporting a categorical
prohibition against public company executives taking corporate opportunities).
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and the insufficiency of opt-in regulation if the optimal contracting
model is not fully descriptive of the contracting environment.
CONCLUSION
If the most striking trend in executive compensation over the
past several decades has been its seemingly inexorable rise
upward,21 a close second is its steadily increasing complexity and
opacity. These trends may be related. As little as twenty years ago,
cash salary was the dominant form of executive compensation.219
Today executive stock options have supplanted cash salary as the
largest single component of the average large company CEO's pay
package, 2 0 but options are only a small part of the picture. Modern
CEO compensation packages include cash, options, restricted stock,
phantom stock and options, a wide variety of bonus opportunities,
not to mention an ever-expanding array of benefits and perks, many
of which, such as SERPs and deferred compensation plans, repre-
sent significant financial commitments by shareholders.
In addition to the increasing complexity of conventional compen-
sation and benefit programs, relaxation of corporate fiduciary
law has led to increased executive access to nonconventional
appropriation channels such as self-dealing and the taking of
corporate opportunities. Even with enhanced SEC disclosure
requirements, quantifying and evaluating executive compensation
today is a much more difficult proposition than it was twenty years
ago. This Article has argued that this increasing complexity and
opacity has been costly for shareholders. Even if one subscribes to
the optimal contracting model of corporate governance, access to
certain channels of appropriation has likely led to an overall
increase in managerial appropriation. If one is skeptical of the
optimal contracting story and thinks it more likely that compensa-
tion is limited by external market forces or saliency and outrage in
accordance with the managerial power view, then one must conclude
218. See Perry & Zenner, supra note 147, at 123-24 (documenting the dramatic increase
in CEO compensation during the 1990s); see also Murphy, supra note 56, at 2486 (providing
similar information).
219. See Murphy, supra note 56, at 2487 fig. 1.
220. Id. at 2515.
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that this increased complexity and opacity has led to a very
significant rise in the manager's share of corporate value.
